The procurement and development budget Department of Defense is under fire; this is no secret. The incoming administration wants to increase that amount of fire; this is also no secret. Experts are expecting several projects, such as the F-22, the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS), and most of the Navy's new surface combatant programs to be cut heavily or, worse, canceled outright.
This would be, in my opinion, as stupid as stupid gets.
To be fair, however, DoD brought this on itself as much as any external force of pressure. Since the heyday of World War II, DoD's ability to procure and develop systems, while remaining impressive, has endured a severe loss of quality and effectiveness. Simply put: we don't do it like we used to.
More and more of DoD's design and development happens out-of-house. That is, not under the direct control of the Department of Defense. While this is very much an American capitalist ideal, it is not necessarily the best way to run things. In fact, the DoD should almost inarguably be the one department of our government that is 100% self-sufficient. Defense should not rely on anyone other than the defenders. That being stated, external input should always be welcomed.
There is also the American propensity to want to make "leaps and bounds" in technology before implementing improvements. In other words, we like waiting for the next big thing, rather than enduring the purchases of several stages of "little things." Economists might tell you this is the reason the Japanese overtook us in electronics and automobiles, and they would be right. This attitude of "bigger, better, now" is also what's hurting our military. And, again, we can point to the heyday of World War II.
You see, in the 1930s, 40s, and even the 50s, weapons systems obsolesced insanely quickly. Some within a year of being fielded. While most of us find that an incomprehensible concept, we would only have to look at modern computer development to find a contemporary example of such a phenomenon. While the WWII-era system of procurement and development was by no means cheap, it was wholly effective, and set the stage for our rapid advancement through the 1970s, the last great era for design and development until now.
Yes, systems were purchased and then "thrown away" quickly. But those throw-aways had benefit. They provided us with ample material to recycle, an excess of quality training tools, and, in their most important roles, served as test-beds for countless technological innovations (some major, some minor). We no longer have that capability today.
And why not? Well, bureacracy and politics. Every politician and general or admiral wants to be able to put their "stamp" on a particular system. Which means every politician and general or admiral naturally avoids the "small scale" innovations that could keep our procurement process cheap, yet continuously evolving in the field, and not just in the lab.
Take, for instance, the new rail gun system the Navy wants to field by 2025. The truth of the matter is that the Navy could field one tomorrow. But they would have to combine an old technology with a new one, and relegate their ultimate goal of "a new gun on a new ship" to a secondary goal.
The current rail guns can feasibly be mounted on a battleship. No, they're not as powerful as the Navy wants, but they're as powerful or more powerful than most of the other gun systems found in the world today. And we could test them in the field.
Instead, the Navy seems content with lab-testing a rail gun, waiting 10-years until the system is small and efficient enough to be mounted on a destroyer (of probably a new build or design), and then send it out into the world... without the data we could be accumulating by putting one of these bad boys on a battleship.
Mark my words: implementing the so-called "final design" of these rail guns will become far, far more expensive than currently expected because of our indirect policy of waiting. Just look at the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Bloated design and development; horrendously overbudget. Look at the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Bloated design and development; horrendously overbudget. Hell, our Air Force can't even procure a new mid-air refueler with any semblance of an efficient process. And, yet, in World War II, we had weapons systems go from idea, to drawing board, to construction, to deployment in less than a year.
But we don't like looking to the past, and we certainly don't like making small, seemingly insignificant improvements. It takes too long. The end result seems less important. Nobody can try to take all of the credit. And Al Gore invented the Internet.
Seriously, we have weapons systems still in use today that were in service 30, or even 40, years ago. And why? Because those weapons systems are constantly upgraded at a consistent pace. But nobody notices. Even the services themselves seem less interested in fixing up older systems. It's not "sexy." The new shit is.
Well, sexier don't mean better.
Showing posts with label Department of Defense. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Department of Defense. Show all posts
Saturday, November 15, 2008
Wednesday, November 5, 2008
It's the End of the World As We Know It
... and I feel fine.
So, Barack Obama will be the 44th President of the United States. Good for him, and good for everyone who voted for him. Did I? In a rare case of revealing my political cards: no. But neither did I vote for McCain. To be honest, I didn't vote... I tried to, but between forgetting where I'm registered (I found multiple voter registration cards), then figuring it out only to realize my truck isn't running, I, well... no excuses.
I wasn't going to vote for President this year, anyway. I did have a vote for my state's governor and senator, but whatever.
Anyway, Obama's going to be sworn in next January. He is going to try to "change" a helluva a lot of things. But, make no mistake, most of those changes don't stand a chance in Hades of happening. In fact, outside of his economic plan, I really doubt we'll see much real change at all. Ironically, it will be his own party that prevents it.
Seriously, hear me out. Right or wrong, Obama will be put under the most powerful microscope ever put on a President simply because he is black. As a result, he will have to run a near-perfect ship. And that means not only keeping the people who voted for him happy, but making as many of the people who didn't at least not unhappy. I do not envy that man and the tightrope he will be walking.
No, I'm not really worried for this country as far as the election goes. Not yet, anyway. Guns will not be outlawed, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will not come to sudden stops, and corporations will still run rampant.
I am, however, worried for this country as far as Obama's military and paramilitary ideas go. He wants to shrink DoD's budget. Bad idea. The way he wants to do it will unavoidably result in a smaller military. Bad idea. And I'm still rather concerned over the comments he made earlier this year regarding a gendarme of the United States. Ridiculously foolish idea.
He may be better for the economy, but he is not better for the security of this country.
But, he won. Fair and square. I anxiously await to see how he does his job, as, I'm sure, you do. Maybe he'll be a great President, maybe he'll suck. I figure he'll be at least fairly competent, but will not enter the history books as one of America's great Presidents such as Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts. He will only enter the history books as being the one to break the race barrier in American politics. And, presidential effectiveness aside, that's a good thing.
Do your job, sir. That's all anyone can ask. Except, of course, for the wholly un-American people who will no doubt claim they want to leave this country now that Obama is President. Funny how those wholly un-American people who claimed they were going to leave under Bush are now shouting out that they're some sort of patriots. Bullshit... real American patriots tough out the times they hate as much as they enjoy the times the love, and that includes tolerating the leaders they don't much care for.
It is definitely the end of the world as we know it, and, yes, I feel just fine.
So, Barack Obama will be the 44th President of the United States. Good for him, and good for everyone who voted for him. Did I? In a rare case of revealing my political cards: no. But neither did I vote for McCain. To be honest, I didn't vote... I tried to, but between forgetting where I'm registered (I found multiple voter registration cards), then figuring it out only to realize my truck isn't running, I, well... no excuses.
I wasn't going to vote for President this year, anyway. I did have a vote for my state's governor and senator, but whatever.
Anyway, Obama's going to be sworn in next January. He is going to try to "change" a helluva a lot of things. But, make no mistake, most of those changes don't stand a chance in Hades of happening. In fact, outside of his economic plan, I really doubt we'll see much real change at all. Ironically, it will be his own party that prevents it.
Seriously, hear me out. Right or wrong, Obama will be put under the most powerful microscope ever put on a President simply because he is black. As a result, he will have to run a near-perfect ship. And that means not only keeping the people who voted for him happy, but making as many of the people who didn't at least not unhappy. I do not envy that man and the tightrope he will be walking.
No, I'm not really worried for this country as far as the election goes. Not yet, anyway. Guns will not be outlawed, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will not come to sudden stops, and corporations will still run rampant.
I am, however, worried for this country as far as Obama's military and paramilitary ideas go. He wants to shrink DoD's budget. Bad idea. The way he wants to do it will unavoidably result in a smaller military. Bad idea. And I'm still rather concerned over the comments he made earlier this year regarding a gendarme of the United States. Ridiculously foolish idea.
He may be better for the economy, but he is not better for the security of this country.
But, he won. Fair and square. I anxiously await to see how he does his job, as, I'm sure, you do. Maybe he'll be a great President, maybe he'll suck. I figure he'll be at least fairly competent, but will not enter the history books as one of America's great Presidents such as Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts. He will only enter the history books as being the one to break the race barrier in American politics. And, presidential effectiveness aside, that's a good thing.
Do your job, sir. That's all anyone can ask. Except, of course, for the wholly un-American people who will no doubt claim they want to leave this country now that Obama is President. Funny how those wholly un-American people who claimed they were going to leave under Bush are now shouting out that they're some sort of patriots. Bullshit... real American patriots tough out the times they hate as much as they enjoy the times the love, and that includes tolerating the leaders they don't much care for.
It is definitely the end of the world as we know it, and, yes, I feel just fine.
Monday, June 2, 2008
Every Man a Rifleman
There's the Army. There's the Marine Corps. On paper, almost 100% identical in tactics, strategy, logistics, and mission. Sure, the Marine Corps is dictated by one more sentence regarding its ability to be "directly controlled by the President" (which is, so sad to say, mere lip service) and the word "amphibious" is replaced by "airborne" when pertaining to the Army, but you get the point.
Ideally, these services are identical, save for method of deployment and primary objectives. Practically, however, these services are as different as two land-based military branches run by the same government can be.
For those who aren't familiar with my (highly-researched) opinions, let me back up a tad... I believe the United States Marine Corps should not fall under the umbrella of the Department of the Navy, but should in fact belong to the Department of the Army. Basic and intermediate trainings of both the Army and Marine Corps should be identical and, in fact, shared. Their recruiting and logistics systems should be combined. Long story short: the Army and the Marine Corps should be a single branch of service.
Regarding this, however, the theoretical philosophical basis of the Marine Corps is far, far better than the theoretical philosophical basis of the Army (which, as far as I can tell, doesn't have one). In the Marine Corps: "every man a rifleman." This translates to every Marine (male or female) being fundamentally and undeniably a member of Marine infantry, regardless of a Marine's listed job title. While this may make little difference on the actual modern battlefield, given the current dynamic of military strategy and logistics, it does make quite a bit of difference in the day-to-day workplace of a military branch. Yes, most Marines will admit that the "every man a rifleman" is more slogan than reality, but the very fact that the slogan exists is probably effective enough.
In the Army there is a definitive differential between a combat soldier and a support soldier. Not only in training, but in professional attitude. The support soldier exists for one reason and one reason only: to support the combat soldier. There is no need for an admin or finance clerk, or a legal assistant, or a mechanic, or a cook, save for supporting the infantryman (or woman) and his kin. That's all, nothing else.
And therein lies the problem. Support soldiers tend to feel that they run the Army (which, in point of fact, they basically do) and there is a bit of a prejudice against the actual reason for an army's existence, which is the aforementioned combat soldier. These support soldiers live in air conditioning, are usually less physically-fit than combat soldiers, do not train as hard for field operations, and basically treat their role in the Armed Forces as a typical 9 to 5 job (yes, there are exceptions, but everybody knows what I'm talking about). I will go so far as to claim that these "support specialists" are not even true soldiers.
And this needs to be fixed. And quickly.
The Marines do it. All Marines undergo basic combat courses on a semi-regular basis. And I'm not talking about little field exercises or what the Army refers to as "Sergeant's Time." I'm talking full-on schools designed to keep all Marines combat-ready. The clerk, the cook, the air conditioner mechanic. All of them. Why? Well, because in the Marine Corps, "every man a rifleman."
Philosophically, it's perfect for an armed service. EVERYONE should expect to fight, kill, and die, regardless of what their "day job" is. The Marines beat it into their recruits from day one. The Army? Not so much. In fact... not at all.
Almost immediately, the Army separates its combat soldiers from its support soldiers by way of a training system referred to as OSUT or "One-Station Unit Training." Basically, specific combat arms MOS' go to combined boot camp and specialty schools that only that particular MOS goes to. Logistically and financially, OSUT is almost undoubtedly the preferred method of training. However, practically, OSUT is likely the very reason for the attitude split so painfully evident in the ranks of the Army.
The solution is simple. Get rid of OSUT and go back to "everbody" boot camps and combat arm AITs. Require non-combat specialities to attend a combat training course similar to the USMC's MCT (Marine Combat Training) course. Optionally, bring back the specialist ranks for those support soldiers who are not "combat qualified." However it gets done, put the Army back into the hands of the people who should run it: the combatants.
Every Soldier Infantry. How's that sound?
Ideally, these services are identical, save for method of deployment and primary objectives. Practically, however, these services are as different as two land-based military branches run by the same government can be.
For those who aren't familiar with my (highly-researched) opinions, let me back up a tad... I believe the United States Marine Corps should not fall under the umbrella of the Department of the Navy, but should in fact belong to the Department of the Army. Basic and intermediate trainings of both the Army and Marine Corps should be identical and, in fact, shared. Their recruiting and logistics systems should be combined. Long story short: the Army and the Marine Corps should be a single branch of service.
Regarding this, however, the theoretical philosophical basis of the Marine Corps is far, far better than the theoretical philosophical basis of the Army (which, as far as I can tell, doesn't have one). In the Marine Corps: "every man a rifleman." This translates to every Marine (male or female) being fundamentally and undeniably a member of Marine infantry, regardless of a Marine's listed job title. While this may make little difference on the actual modern battlefield, given the current dynamic of military strategy and logistics, it does make quite a bit of difference in the day-to-day workplace of a military branch. Yes, most Marines will admit that the "every man a rifleman" is more slogan than reality, but the very fact that the slogan exists is probably effective enough.
In the Army there is a definitive differential between a combat soldier and a support soldier. Not only in training, but in professional attitude. The support soldier exists for one reason and one reason only: to support the combat soldier. There is no need for an admin or finance clerk, or a legal assistant, or a mechanic, or a cook, save for supporting the infantryman (or woman) and his kin. That's all, nothing else.
And therein lies the problem. Support soldiers tend to feel that they run the Army (which, in point of fact, they basically do) and there is a bit of a prejudice against the actual reason for an army's existence, which is the aforementioned combat soldier. These support soldiers live in air conditioning, are usually less physically-fit than combat soldiers, do not train as hard for field operations, and basically treat their role in the Armed Forces as a typical 9 to 5 job (yes, there are exceptions, but everybody knows what I'm talking about). I will go so far as to claim that these "support specialists" are not even true soldiers.
And this needs to be fixed. And quickly.
The Marines do it. All Marines undergo basic combat courses on a semi-regular basis. And I'm not talking about little field exercises or what the Army refers to as "Sergeant's Time." I'm talking full-on schools designed to keep all Marines combat-ready. The clerk, the cook, the air conditioner mechanic. All of them. Why? Well, because in the Marine Corps, "every man a rifleman."
Philosophically, it's perfect for an armed service. EVERYONE should expect to fight, kill, and die, regardless of what their "day job" is. The Marines beat it into their recruits from day one. The Army? Not so much. In fact... not at all.
Almost immediately, the Army separates its combat soldiers from its support soldiers by way of a training system referred to as OSUT or "One-Station Unit Training." Basically, specific combat arms MOS' go to combined boot camp and specialty schools that only that particular MOS goes to. Logistically and financially, OSUT is almost undoubtedly the preferred method of training. However, practically, OSUT is likely the very reason for the attitude split so painfully evident in the ranks of the Army.
The solution is simple. Get rid of OSUT and go back to "everbody" boot camps and combat arm AITs. Require non-combat specialities to attend a combat training course similar to the USMC's MCT (Marine Combat Training) course. Optionally, bring back the specialist ranks for those support soldiers who are not "combat qualified." However it gets done, put the Army back into the hands of the people who should run it: the combatants.
Every Soldier Infantry. How's that sound?
Friday, January 18, 2008
In Defense of Military Perspectives
Those of you who read me regularly (a shocking thought, I know) know full and well my view concerning the administrative wastefulness in maintaining a Navy-based Marine Corps and a separate Air Force. These views are well-researched, are based upon a study actually conducted by an Air Force Major, and are, undebatably, fact.
Sure, that the concept would ultimately benefit our military's effectiveness is highly opinionated, but that the concept would cheapen the cost of our military and lessen the burden on taxpayers (and allow for a larger military) is, once again, undebatably fact.
I receive a lot of feedback from a lot of people, many of them current and former servicemembers, concerning my highly controversial views. I can honestly say that none of their counterarguments hold any physical, fiscal, or operational weight. While that may sound a bit arrogant on my part, and probably a bit ignorant, it is true. Every counterargument I hear or read boils down to one thing: tradition.
I've said it before and I'll say it again, tradition is a wonderful thing to have (especially in the military) and we should do everything in our power to preserve it, but it should never, ever, get in the way of our adaptability. Ironically, the military seems to agree with most of my points and principles, except they hide my proposals by creating even more-bureaucratic "joint commands" instead of eliminated the fluff that requires the creation of such commands.
Going back to feedback, as I was in the Army for a total of nine years, I am often (if not always) accused of approaching my proposed military restructuring from an Army-centric perspective. I am writing this to show that this is not the case.
When I began my research, it was to support a spinning-off of the Airborne into its own branch of the military. An "Airborne Corps" of the Army, much in the same way the Marine Corps is of the Navy. A self-sufficient fighting force that is only related to its parent unit by way of funding and a shared medium.
My original proposal called for an Airborne Corps with its own close air support assets (like the Marine Corps has) and its own airlift (Army paratroopers currently rely on the Air Force for well over 90% of their jumps). In addition, it would have its own armor assets and logistics structure.
Now, this looked all fine and dandy on paper, and in a fictional short-story or two, but once I got into the budgetary portion of my research, it became clear that such a concept would be entirely cost-prohibitive. It became clear so quickly, that I didn't even bother to continue my research.
So, being a paratrooper and all, I decided to look into the feasibility of an Air Force-run Airborne Corps. After all, why not? Two options quickly set themselves apart from all of the other Air Force-Airborne options: 1) The Air Force would have to build its own infantry administration and operation systems, or 2) the Air Force would simply rely on the Army to train its paratroopers, and then feed them into the Air Force chain-of-command.
The first point would have been, quite obviously, too expensive (seems to be a pattern, doesn't it?) The second would have been, just as obviously, quite redundant.
And then it all came together. A Navy-Marine Corps is redundant, and a separate Air Force hobbles the Army's need for its own air superiority, airlift, and close air support. And, sorry, there's no way you can argue that, save for "tradition" (a point, by the way, which only weakly applies to the Air Force).
Which led to my current line of research, which only convinces me more and more every day that the Marine Corps should realign under the Department of the Army, and Air Force assets should be absorbed by the Army and the Navy.
My point? I started on this route in the exact opposite direction that I am almost always accused of taking. Army-centric? No, not by a long shot.
Airborne-centric? Oh, Hell yeah.
Want to read more? Check here:
Sure, that the concept would ultimately benefit our military's effectiveness is highly opinionated, but that the concept would cheapen the cost of our military and lessen the burden on taxpayers (and allow for a larger military) is, once again, undebatably fact.
I receive a lot of feedback from a lot of people, many of them current and former servicemembers, concerning my highly controversial views. I can honestly say that none of their counterarguments hold any physical, fiscal, or operational weight. While that may sound a bit arrogant on my part, and probably a bit ignorant, it is true. Every counterargument I hear or read boils down to one thing: tradition.
I've said it before and I'll say it again, tradition is a wonderful thing to have (especially in the military) and we should do everything in our power to preserve it, but it should never, ever, get in the way of our adaptability. Ironically, the military seems to agree with most of my points and principles, except they hide my proposals by creating even more-bureaucratic "joint commands" instead of eliminated the fluff that requires the creation of such commands.
Going back to feedback, as I was in the Army for a total of nine years, I am often (if not always) accused of approaching my proposed military restructuring from an Army-centric perspective. I am writing this to show that this is not the case.
When I began my research, it was to support a spinning-off of the Airborne into its own branch of the military. An "Airborne Corps" of the Army, much in the same way the Marine Corps is of the Navy. A self-sufficient fighting force that is only related to its parent unit by way of funding and a shared medium.
My original proposal called for an Airborne Corps with its own close air support assets (like the Marine Corps has) and its own airlift (Army paratroopers currently rely on the Air Force for well over 90% of their jumps). In addition, it would have its own armor assets and logistics structure.
Now, this looked all fine and dandy on paper, and in a fictional short-story or two, but once I got into the budgetary portion of my research, it became clear that such a concept would be entirely cost-prohibitive. It became clear so quickly, that I didn't even bother to continue my research.
So, being a paratrooper and all, I decided to look into the feasibility of an Air Force-run Airborne Corps. After all, why not? Two options quickly set themselves apart from all of the other Air Force-Airborne options: 1) The Air Force would have to build its own infantry administration and operation systems, or 2) the Air Force would simply rely on the Army to train its paratroopers, and then feed them into the Air Force chain-of-command.
The first point would have been, quite obviously, too expensive (seems to be a pattern, doesn't it?) The second would have been, just as obviously, quite redundant.
And then it all came together. A Navy-Marine Corps is redundant, and a separate Air Force hobbles the Army's need for its own air superiority, airlift, and close air support. And, sorry, there's no way you can argue that, save for "tradition" (a point, by the way, which only weakly applies to the Air Force).
Which led to my current line of research, which only convinces me more and more every day that the Marine Corps should realign under the Department of the Army, and Air Force assets should be absorbed by the Army and the Navy.
My point? I started on this route in the exact opposite direction that I am almost always accused of taking. Army-centric? No, not by a long shot.
Airborne-centric? Oh, Hell yeah.
Want to read more? Check here:
Friday, November 30, 2007
Marine Corps versus Army: the Rank Problem
Given the current flow of information from the Department of Defense, one might assume that there aren't enough ranks in the military to properly control and command our armed forces. After all, while already having nine enlisted grades, there are often reports of the services trying to approve a tenth grade, to be reserved for the top enlisted man (or woman) in a particular service. On top of that, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are inundated with an oft-confusing "warrant officer" system that is, to be quite honest, redundant and pragmatically unnecessary.
Both of these quirky little facts, combined with an officer system that contains up to eleven ranks (ten in peacetime), and what we actually have is a system that is too large, overwrought, and bad for business. Particularly when it comes to discipline.
While the majority of what I'm going to rant about concerns the enlisted ranks, let's go ahead and gloss over the officer system.
Eleven ranks. With the exception of the Navy, the rank structure for officers proceeds like this:
1. Second Lieutenant
2. First Lieutenant
3. Captain
4. Major
5. Lieutenant Colonel
6. Colonel
7. Brigadier General
8. Major General
9. Lieutenant General
10. General
11. General of the Army (Air Force - the USMC has no equivalent).
What's the problem, you might ask? Well, for starters, this rank system is designed to deal with an armed force based on a regimental system. A system that we quit using nearly a century ago. But to spell it out, let's take a look at the "natural progression," shall we?
In the Army and Marine Corps, units commanded by officers progress as such:
1. Platoons - commanded by Second Lieutenants
2. Companies (or their "regimental equivalent" - basically, whether it's cavalry, artillery, or infantry) - commanded by Captains
3. Battalions - commanded by Lieutenant Colonels
4. Brigades - commanded by Colonels, or, depending on the make-up, Brigadier Generals (which is where the name "Brigadier" originated)
5. Divisions - commanded by Major Generals
6. Corps - commanded by Lieutenant Generals
7. Armies - commanded by Generals
There are more above armies, but unless another true world war breaks out, they're not likely to be used ever again. Indeed, even the "basis unit" has shifted downward to brigades, rather than divisions.
Anyway, take a look at that unit/officer chart. Where are, for instance, the natural positions for First Lieutenants and Majors? I understand that I'm asking you to infer a lot on your own, and I will probably follow this up with another article explaining the inherent problem with those ommissions, but just bear with me.
From that chart alone, and without any other justification, we have two officer ranks too many. More evidence, including some implied above, would also suggest that colonels should shift down to battalions, leaving brigadier generals in their natural position of commanding brigades, allowing the lieutenant colonel rank to also be ommitted.
Ugh... on to the enlisted ranks.
Here are the Army/Marine Corps ranks for enlisted:
1. Private / Private
2. Private / Private First Class
3. Private First Class / Lance Corporal
4. Corporal (Specialist) / Corporal
5. Sergeant / Sergeant
6. Staff Sergeant / Staff Sergeant
7. Sergeant First Class / Gunnery Sergeant
8. Master Sergeant / Master Sergeant
9. Sergeant Major / Sergeant Major
Those soldiers and Marines reading this will know there are some variations to some of these ranks, but, again, bear with me.
Okay... nine ranks... and for what?
To put this in perspective, let's look at the basic infantry squads in both the Army and Marine Corps.
In the Army, the basic infantry squad is a nine-man unit, with a squad leader and two teams consisting of a team leader, grenadier, automatic rifleman, and rifleman each.
The squad is commanded by a Staff Sergeant (E-6), while the teams are commanded by Sergeants (E-5). The remaining six soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1 or E-2), Privates First Class (E-3), Specialists (E-4), or Corporals (also E-4).
So, basically, the building-block unit of the Army has three Non-Commissioned Officers, and six other enlisted. A 1:2 ratio. Keep in mind, the non-NCOs can consist of all E-1s or all E-4s, or any variation in-between and thereof.
Where's the rank structure? Where's the top-down? How fucking stupid is that? Six separate grades for nine people?
The Marine Corps' setup is, undeniably, far more logical. A basic Marine Corps infantry squad is thirteen men, with a squad leader and three teams consisting of a team leader, an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and a rifleman each.
The MC squad is commanded by a Sergeant (E-5), while the teams are commanded by Corporals (E-4). The remaining nine soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1), Privates First Class (E-2), or Lance Corporals (E-3).
Though still a bit of a muddled mess, there is far more of a semblance of a proper rank structure in the Marine Corps squad than is found in the Army squad.
However, in both systems, we have revealed at least two too many enlisted grades at the squad level.
Here is how it should progress:
1. Privates - in charge of nothing
2. Corporals - in charge of fire teams
3. Sergeants - in charge of squads
4. Staff/Gunnery Sergeants - Platoon Sergeants
5. Master Sergeants - Company First Sergeants, etc.
6. Sergeant Majors - Senior Battalion(+) enlisted.
An elimination of three enlisted ranks, a streamlining of the enlisted chain-of-command, an increase in respect for the lower enlisted ranks, and a true merit-based promotion system.
Counter-arguments against doing such a thing (besides the totally irrelevant and inane "tradition" argument) will probably focus on the ability to promote soldiers to increase their wages. While I'm always for making more money, do we really want soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen shooting for promotions ONLY because the next rank pays more? Fuck no, we don't. We want sergeants who WANT to be sergeants, because they WANT the power and responsibility that comes with it... not because they want another $200 or $300 a month. And regardless, that problem is so easily fixed, I'm going to point out how in the next paragraph.
The Army and Marine Corps' pay and promotion system is already heavily computerized, and separating pay grade from rank would be as simple as modifying the computer software. Hell, in that aspect, the military could create as many pay grades as it deems necessary, all while leaving the rank structure streamlined, intact, and with a clear chain-of-command. It's high-time we start streamlining things and bringing back respect for our ranks.
(Yes, I'm just glossing the surface, and, yes, I realize this post is a little chaotic, but hopefully your eyes are opening a little bit. Feel free to hammer me with questions and arguments.)
Both of these quirky little facts, combined with an officer system that contains up to eleven ranks (ten in peacetime), and what we actually have is a system that is too large, overwrought, and bad for business. Particularly when it comes to discipline.
While the majority of what I'm going to rant about concerns the enlisted ranks, let's go ahead and gloss over the officer system.
Eleven ranks. With the exception of the Navy, the rank structure for officers proceeds like this:
1. Second Lieutenant
2. First Lieutenant
3. Captain
4. Major
5. Lieutenant Colonel
6. Colonel
7. Brigadier General
8. Major General
9. Lieutenant General
10. General
11. General of the Army (Air Force - the USMC has no equivalent).
What's the problem, you might ask? Well, for starters, this rank system is designed to deal with an armed force based on a regimental system. A system that we quit using nearly a century ago. But to spell it out, let's take a look at the "natural progression," shall we?
In the Army and Marine Corps, units commanded by officers progress as such:
1. Platoons - commanded by Second Lieutenants
2. Companies (or their "regimental equivalent" - basically, whether it's cavalry, artillery, or infantry) - commanded by Captains
3. Battalions - commanded by Lieutenant Colonels
4. Brigades - commanded by Colonels, or, depending on the make-up, Brigadier Generals (which is where the name "Brigadier" originated)
5. Divisions - commanded by Major Generals
6. Corps - commanded by Lieutenant Generals
7. Armies - commanded by Generals
There are more above armies, but unless another true world war breaks out, they're not likely to be used ever again. Indeed, even the "basis unit" has shifted downward to brigades, rather than divisions.
Anyway, take a look at that unit/officer chart. Where are, for instance, the natural positions for First Lieutenants and Majors? I understand that I'm asking you to infer a lot on your own, and I will probably follow this up with another article explaining the inherent problem with those ommissions, but just bear with me.
From that chart alone, and without any other justification, we have two officer ranks too many. More evidence, including some implied above, would also suggest that colonels should shift down to battalions, leaving brigadier generals in their natural position of commanding brigades, allowing the lieutenant colonel rank to also be ommitted.
Ugh... on to the enlisted ranks.
Here are the Army/Marine Corps ranks for enlisted:
1. Private / Private
2. Private / Private First Class
3. Private First Class / Lance Corporal
4. Corporal (Specialist) / Corporal
5. Sergeant / Sergeant
6. Staff Sergeant / Staff Sergeant
7. Sergeant First Class / Gunnery Sergeant
8. Master Sergeant / Master Sergeant
9. Sergeant Major / Sergeant Major
Those soldiers and Marines reading this will know there are some variations to some of these ranks, but, again, bear with me.
Okay... nine ranks... and for what?
To put this in perspective, let's look at the basic infantry squads in both the Army and Marine Corps.
In the Army, the basic infantry squad is a nine-man unit, with a squad leader and two teams consisting of a team leader, grenadier, automatic rifleman, and rifleman each.
The squad is commanded by a Staff Sergeant (E-6), while the teams are commanded by Sergeants (E-5). The remaining six soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1 or E-2), Privates First Class (E-3), Specialists (E-4), or Corporals (also E-4).
So, basically, the building-block unit of the Army has three Non-Commissioned Officers, and six other enlisted. A 1:2 ratio. Keep in mind, the non-NCOs can consist of all E-1s or all E-4s, or any variation in-between and thereof.
Where's the rank structure? Where's the top-down? How fucking stupid is that? Six separate grades for nine people?
The Marine Corps' setup is, undeniably, far more logical. A basic Marine Corps infantry squad is thirteen men, with a squad leader and three teams consisting of a team leader, an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and a rifleman each.
The MC squad is commanded by a Sergeant (E-5), while the teams are commanded by Corporals (E-4). The remaining nine soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1), Privates First Class (E-2), or Lance Corporals (E-3).
Though still a bit of a muddled mess, there is far more of a semblance of a proper rank structure in the Marine Corps squad than is found in the Army squad.
However, in both systems, we have revealed at least two too many enlisted grades at the squad level.
Here is how it should progress:
1. Privates - in charge of nothing
2. Corporals - in charge of fire teams
3. Sergeants - in charge of squads
4. Staff/Gunnery Sergeants - Platoon Sergeants
5. Master Sergeants - Company First Sergeants, etc.
6. Sergeant Majors - Senior Battalion(+) enlisted.
An elimination of three enlisted ranks, a streamlining of the enlisted chain-of-command, an increase in respect for the lower enlisted ranks, and a true merit-based promotion system.
Counter-arguments against doing such a thing (besides the totally irrelevant and inane "tradition" argument) will probably focus on the ability to promote soldiers to increase their wages. While I'm always for making more money, do we really want soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen shooting for promotions ONLY because the next rank pays more? Fuck no, we don't. We want sergeants who WANT to be sergeants, because they WANT the power and responsibility that comes with it... not because they want another $200 or $300 a month. And regardless, that problem is so easily fixed, I'm going to point out how in the next paragraph.
The Army and Marine Corps' pay and promotion system is already heavily computerized, and separating pay grade from rank would be as simple as modifying the computer software. Hell, in that aspect, the military could create as many pay grades as it deems necessary, all while leaving the rank structure streamlined, intact, and with a clear chain-of-command. It's high-time we start streamlining things and bringing back respect for our ranks.
(Yes, I'm just glossing the surface, and, yes, I realize this post is a little chaotic, but hopefully your eyes are opening a little bit. Feel free to hammer me with questions and arguments.)
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
The United States Air Force: a Parasite Organization
Before I get started on my well-researched rant, I just want to state that I don't think the men and women of the USAF are jerks, pansies, or parasites. Far from. They are as good as any other member of our armed forces, ready when we need them, willing when we ask them, and able when we send them.
But...
The USAF itself is a large waste of money.
First point: simply analyze our air power in our various armed forces. The Army has the largest "air presence" of any service. The Navy has their own air superiority, airlift, and strike capabilities. The Marine Corps has their own airlift, strike, and close air-support capabilities. The Air Force has all of that, plus strategic air. All this means that the people of the United States are essentially paying for four air forces, each with overlapping and oft-conflicting roles. Um... why? Politics, "tradition," and politics.
Second point: While the Navy and Marine Corps absolutely need their own air support (whether inherent to their services or provided by the air force), so does the Army. So why did the DoD arbitrarily decide that the Department of the Navy get to keep its aviation assets, while the Department of the Army did not? Politics, "tradition," and politics.
Given the current nature of DoD organization and budget, it's clear that the government wants to spend as little as possible on how the military is structured and operated. In a natural progression, DoD should streamline commands, eliminate flag positions, and put asset control in as few pots as possible (notice I wrote asset control, not the assets themselves). Which, obviously, would lead to the Army and Navy controlling their own air support. Well, like I said, the Navy does it, why not the Army?
Simply put, the United States Air Force would run much more efficiently should it "devolve" back into the Army Air Force. Army commanders would have their own air superiority, airlift, and close air support aircraft to use on pertinent missions, instead of having to ask and coordinate with the USAF. I mean, why does the USAF control tactical airlift, anyway? They don't need it for themselves on a large scale. But guess who does? That's right, the Army.
It's also common knowledge that the USAF (the institution, mind you, not its individual pilots) doesn't really care about its legally mandated CAS (close air support) mission. Why? Well, because they don't need it for themselves. But guess who does?
Anyway, this can of worms can be opened much wider, but the bottom line is that the USAF should either assume control of ALL air assets in the DoD (which still leaves the problem of "asking" and coordinating), or should collapse itself back into the Army, with the Air Force's United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) component (formerly known as Strategic Air Command - SAC) shifting entirely to Navy control.
This would cut many middlemen out, streamline top-down command and communications, and allow for closer operational training between the various arms.
I know a whole hell of a lot of people will disagree with me, but can you really give me any advantages that can trump saving money? Other than "tradition" and politics, of course.
But...
The USAF itself is a large waste of money.
First point: simply analyze our air power in our various armed forces. The Army has the largest "air presence" of any service. The Navy has their own air superiority, airlift, and strike capabilities. The Marine Corps has their own airlift, strike, and close air-support capabilities. The Air Force has all of that, plus strategic air. All this means that the people of the United States are essentially paying for four air forces, each with overlapping and oft-conflicting roles. Um... why? Politics, "tradition," and politics.
Second point: While the Navy and Marine Corps absolutely need their own air support (whether inherent to their services or provided by the air force), so does the Army. So why did the DoD arbitrarily decide that the Department of the Navy get to keep its aviation assets, while the Department of the Army did not? Politics, "tradition," and politics.
Given the current nature of DoD organization and budget, it's clear that the government wants to spend as little as possible on how the military is structured and operated. In a natural progression, DoD should streamline commands, eliminate flag positions, and put asset control in as few pots as possible (notice I wrote asset control, not the assets themselves). Which, obviously, would lead to the Army and Navy controlling their own air support. Well, like I said, the Navy does it, why not the Army?
Simply put, the United States Air Force would run much more efficiently should it "devolve" back into the Army Air Force. Army commanders would have their own air superiority, airlift, and close air support aircraft to use on pertinent missions, instead of having to ask and coordinate with the USAF. I mean, why does the USAF control tactical airlift, anyway? They don't need it for themselves on a large scale. But guess who does? That's right, the Army.
It's also common knowledge that the USAF (the institution, mind you, not its individual pilots) doesn't really care about its legally mandated CAS (close air support) mission. Why? Well, because they don't need it for themselves. But guess who does?
Anyway, this can of worms can be opened much wider, but the bottom line is that the USAF should either assume control of ALL air assets in the DoD (which still leaves the problem of "asking" and coordinating), or should collapse itself back into the Army, with the Air Force's United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) component (formerly known as Strategic Air Command - SAC) shifting entirely to Navy control.
This would cut many middlemen out, streamline top-down command and communications, and allow for closer operational training between the various arms.
I know a whole hell of a lot of people will disagree with me, but can you really give me any advantages that can trump saving money? Other than "tradition" and politics, of course.
Sunday, September 3, 2006
The Army Corps of... Marines?
Like most former military, I follow our "wars" quite closely. While I'm not going to get into the politics of the matter, I'm definitely going to harp on the cost.
Seriously, what are we thinking? Can we possibly come up with a less efficient model with which to not only fight a war, but to run a military in general?
A few years ago, a Pentagon brain decided to analyze the current makeup of the US Armed Forces. His name was David Dyche and his conclusions in 1990 showed that, not only was the military wasting money on what everyone already knew that the military was wasting money on, but that the military was wasting money simply by existing in its current model. Through careful research and modeling, he figured that our current military was NOT the traditional "3 Branches + 1 Corps" that everyone thinks it is, but in reality is "two armies, two transportation forces, and four air forces." In other words, one huge waste of money (for those of you that are interested in Dyche's report, it is available online - keep in mind that I do NOT agree with Dyche's recommendations 100%, though his points are no less valid).
Now, I'm not going to get into the nitty-gritty of his entire report, but I am going to comment on the Army/Marine Corps conundrum.
Essentially, what we have with a Navy-run Marine Corps is a SECOND ARMY. One that has a separate training system, a separate supply system, and a separate command structure. Is there a physical need for this? Absolutely not.
Traditionalists (including many former and current soldiers, airborne, and marines) will argue the necessity of a separate Marine Corps, but in all honesty, that is nothing but an old-school mentality stuck in a status quo world. A non-Army Marine Corps is simply nothing but a waste of time and money. Many of these traditionalists will argue that the role of the Marine Corps is different than that of the Army. While there is some (but very little) truth to that statement, their roles are no more different than say, that of the Army Infantry compared to the Army Airborne. And, despite the fact that some countries do, we certainly don't have a separate Airborne Corps, do we?
Realize that I'm not advocating the disappearance of Marine Corps traditions from the Army... absolutely not. Even as a former paratrooper, I recognize that no service takes more pride in themselves than the USMC. I think that allowing Marine Corps divisions to retain their distinctive headgear (similar to Airborne units wearing maroon berets) and their traditional histories is a good, and advantageous, idea. I would also suggest that the Army adopt the Marine Corps system of "Private-Private First Class-Lance Corporal" and maintain "Gunnery Sergeant" as a Marine Division honorific.
But, I AM advocating that paying for what is essentially a second Army is a waste. Joint Operations is getting to the point that the Army would be more than capable of cooperatively running an MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) with the Navy, as well as the Navy cooperatively transporting and deploying the Army.
This would save SO MUCH MONEY, it would make you sick to actually figure out how much. There are other advantages, as well, but I lack the time and the proper means to discuss them effectively here. The bonus? There is simply not one disadvantage, other than window-dressing, to collapsing the Marine Corps into the Army. Not one. Not a single one.
Before I conclude my point, I'm well aware that many of you will bring up Marine Corps aviation and how the Marines have dedicated air support. I AM a proponent of this, but this is related to the fact that I'm also a proponent of eliminating the Air Force as we currently know it. However, as this is not the point of this blog, I'm not going to cover any of that here.
So... like I implied, the only problem is getting past the institutionalized fuckers that don't really give a shit about saving this country valuable defense dollars, but care far more about what their uniform looks like.
Seriously, what are we thinking? Can we possibly come up with a less efficient model with which to not only fight a war, but to run a military in general?
A few years ago, a Pentagon brain decided to analyze the current makeup of the US Armed Forces. His name was David Dyche and his conclusions in 1990 showed that, not only was the military wasting money on what everyone already knew that the military was wasting money on, but that the military was wasting money simply by existing in its current model. Through careful research and modeling, he figured that our current military was NOT the traditional "3 Branches + 1 Corps" that everyone thinks it is, but in reality is "two armies, two transportation forces, and four air forces." In other words, one huge waste of money (for those of you that are interested in Dyche's report, it is available online - keep in mind that I do NOT agree with Dyche's recommendations 100%, though his points are no less valid).
Now, I'm not going to get into the nitty-gritty of his entire report, but I am going to comment on the Army/Marine Corps conundrum.
Essentially, what we have with a Navy-run Marine Corps is a SECOND ARMY. One that has a separate training system, a separate supply system, and a separate command structure. Is there a physical need for this? Absolutely not.
Traditionalists (including many former and current soldiers, airborne, and marines) will argue the necessity of a separate Marine Corps, but in all honesty, that is nothing but an old-school mentality stuck in a status quo world. A non-Army Marine Corps is simply nothing but a waste of time and money. Many of these traditionalists will argue that the role of the Marine Corps is different than that of the Army. While there is some (but very little) truth to that statement, their roles are no more different than say, that of the Army Infantry compared to the Army Airborne. And, despite the fact that some countries do, we certainly don't have a separate Airborne Corps, do we?
Realize that I'm not advocating the disappearance of Marine Corps traditions from the Army... absolutely not. Even as a former paratrooper, I recognize that no service takes more pride in themselves than the USMC. I think that allowing Marine Corps divisions to retain their distinctive headgear (similar to Airborne units wearing maroon berets) and their traditional histories is a good, and advantageous, idea. I would also suggest that the Army adopt the Marine Corps system of "Private-Private First Class-Lance Corporal" and maintain "Gunnery Sergeant" as a Marine Division honorific.
But, I AM advocating that paying for what is essentially a second Army is a waste. Joint Operations is getting to the point that the Army would be more than capable of cooperatively running an MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) with the Navy, as well as the Navy cooperatively transporting and deploying the Army.
This would save SO MUCH MONEY, it would make you sick to actually figure out how much. There are other advantages, as well, but I lack the time and the proper means to discuss them effectively here. The bonus? There is simply not one disadvantage, other than window-dressing, to collapsing the Marine Corps into the Army. Not one. Not a single one.
Before I conclude my point, I'm well aware that many of you will bring up Marine Corps aviation and how the Marines have dedicated air support. I AM a proponent of this, but this is related to the fact that I'm also a proponent of eliminating the Air Force as we currently know it. However, as this is not the point of this blog, I'm not going to cover any of that here.
So... like I implied, the only problem is getting past the institutionalized fuckers that don't really give a shit about saving this country valuable defense dollars, but care far more about what their uniform looks like.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
