As a superpower with global reach and concerns, our military is trained, equipped, and prepared to go anywhere anytime the need arises. Almost. While we are no doubt prepared for desert-based conflicts and have increased our urban warfare capabilities exponentially since the 1990s, we lack a particular capability that is particularly important today, given our involvement in Afghanistan: mountain warfare.
Wait, what?
Yes, you read that right. Our mountain warfare infrastructure leaves something to be desired. Simply put, we have no units that maintain an at-ready status to deploy to mountainous territories. And this is despite having a "mountain division" on active Army rolls.
Not unsurprisingly, a third-party analysis of American mountain warfare capabilities revealed a serious lack of immediacy in the United States Army and United States Marine Corps' mountain readiness. The analysis was written by an officer in the Pakistani Army back in 2004, and seems to have gone unnoticed by American military planners of then and now.
Strangely, the US military maintains three very effective "mountain warfare" schools, two run by the Army and one by the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, each of these schools maintain emphases on mountaineering, rather than the physical action of combat in mountainous terrain. Sure, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center conducts a field exercise of sorts, but little of it entails running operations of any significant longevity, and almost completely ignores the problems of resupply and heavy logistics. Critics could even easily claim that the field exercise is barely more than a simple game of laser tag. And no combat units are stationed at the post (Pickel Meadow, California).
Of the two Army mountain warfare courses, one, the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, is more dedicated to cold weather operations (obviously) and conducts their mountaineering training near the Black Rapids Glacier. The other, the Army's formal Mountain Warfare School, is located in Jericho, Vermont, amid the foothills of the Green Mountains. Again, neither post maintains an active mountain warfare unit.
Which brings us to the Army's vaunted (sort of) 10th Mountain Division. Inactive since 1958 (when it was a simple infantry division), it was reactivated in 1985 due to Reagan's insistence on having an alpine division. Ironically, some genius in the Army think-tank decided to garrison the division at Fort Drum, New York. A nice, flat strip of acreage located a whopping 200 feet above sea level. You know, the perfect elevation to keep soldiers acclimated to fighting in high elevations. Worse still, the post is located roughly 80 miles from the highest peaks of the Adirondacks, which include Mount Marcy (approximately 5300 feet) and Algonquin Peak (approximately 5100 feet). While these peaks certainly make for excellent training, once again, no combat units are permanently stationed at those elevations.
Historically, the 10th Mountain Division formed and trained for World War II at Camp Hale, Colorado, almost 9,000 feet above sea level. Located within the Camp's borders was Copper Mountain, whose peak sits at over 12,000 feet. An ideal location to train and breed mountain soldiers, undoubtedly. Unfortunately, Hale is no longer an active military post, so the current Army lacks its option.
Still, Colorado does lay claim to another prominent Army fort, Fort Carson, which rests nicely at about 6,000 feet. Nearby are Cheyenne Mountain (about 9,500 feet) and Pike's Peak (over 14,000 feet). Yet another ideal location to train and breed mountain soldiers.
But, guess what? The division the Army maintains at Carson is not a mountain warfare division, but an armored division: the 4th Infantry Division (armored by MTOE - modified table of organization and equipment). Because, you know, tankers need to be acclimated to drive through hazardous mountain ranges.
The end result is that no unit deploying to the mountain regions of Afghanistan, or anywhere else, is pre-acclimated to the altitudes necessary to operate effectively. Yes, the men and women of our armed forces do a wonderful job of toughing things out until their lungs and muscles adjust to the lower temperatures and levels of oxygen, but why should they have to?
Honestly, does that make any logical sense to anybody? Why make things harder on our soldiers and marines than they are already are?
If someone in the Pentagon would think about for it for more than brief moment, they'd come up with the easy solution: switch the locations of the 4th ID and the 10th Mountain. Hell, other than shipping a few vehicles back and forth, all it would require are a few flag changes and soldiers switching out their uniform patches. And, let's be fair, the opening of a new mountain warfare school. But one that actually teaches the "warfare" part.
Think the Department of Defense can handle that?
Showing posts with label warfare. Show all posts
Showing posts with label warfare. Show all posts
Friday, July 10, 2009
Friday, October 31, 2008
A Two-War Military
We are, without doubt, on the cusp of yet another "brave, new world." The global environment seems to be changing at a faster pace than with the post-World War II independence movements. New safe harbors are popping up, as are new dangerous waters. And, as we approach the adolescent years of the 21st Century, an old superpower is once again flexing its arms, and an ancient superpower is waking from its centuries-long slumber.
On top of all that, terrorism has taken on a new life. No longer dedicated regional acts of violence, terrorism has walked on the world's stage as a superpower unto itself. And American needs to be prepared.
The old saying goes that, "to secure peace is to prepare for war," and it remains as accurate today as it was when it was coined. American needs to be ready to fight wars on two fronts. Only these are not the fronts of western and eastern, or Pacific and Atlantic. These are the fronts of conventional and unconventional warfare.
America has oft made the mistake of downsizing her military when things "seemed safe," usually after the conclusion of a large or protracted war. And, every single time she's done that, she's had to remobilize. Every single time. Bar none.
I assure you, that pattern will not change.
The danger here is that we might make the mistake of downsizing while currently engaged in combat zones. Yes, one can argue that downsizing now would be an effective way of forcing ourselves out of the conflicts we are in, but, regardless of politics, that would be a serious mistake.
Terrorism isn't going anywhere. Trust me, it's not. As long as people somewhere, anywhere, disagree with other people, terrorism and guerrilla warfare will exist. Somewhat thankfully, our government and our military realize this, and our armed forces are transitioning themselves to fight such wars (what the Pentagon painstakingly refers to as "long wars"). This is fine, for we need that capability.
However, we're placing too much emphasis on the so-called "long wars." And we're doing so at the expense of our ability to fight conventional ones.
Russia is clearly staring NATO in the face, waiting for NATO to blink. China is clearly preparing itself to do the very same thing. And what's our response? To downsize.
Already, the Navy has canceled its admittedly ambitious 21st Century destroyer program, and the Army is cutting funding for its Future Combat Systems. Of the FCS, the portions of it that aren't getting the axe are primarily geared for, you guessed it, "long war" operations.
Most people don't seem to realize exactly how small our military has become. Yes, for a number of years, it was probably too big, but no longer. In the 1980s, the military was nearly 600 ships and over 30 combat divisions (including reserve forces). Today, the Navy stands at just over 200 combat ships, and 18 combat divisions (10 active, 8 national guard). Simply put, we don't have enough manpower to do anything.
Both the Russian and Chinese navies are growing, with each indicating that they are constructing new aircraft carriers to support blue water operations. Already, both the Russian and Chinese armies outnumber ours by an alarmingly disproportionate amount. And we're not talking combined, mind you. Including organized reserves, each outnumbers us on their own.
The solution is obvious, though expensive. Cut the fat out of the programs that have obvious fat, but don't further shrink America's military. In fact, grow it. This can be partially funded by doing away with the independent Air Force as well as taking the Marine Corps away from the Navy. The rest can be funded by slicing the fat from those programs that need it.
We need "long war" capability. That is clear. But we also need conventional capability, for at least as long as Russia and China remain possible enemies. For those critics who feel China poses little threat, please inform me exactly why they're expanding their military at a rate rivaled in the past 100 years by only the mobilization efforts of World War II.
Let's not be stupid, here. Let's secure peace.
Unfortunately, to do that, we must prepare for war.
On top of all that, terrorism has taken on a new life. No longer dedicated regional acts of violence, terrorism has walked on the world's stage as a superpower unto itself. And American needs to be prepared.
The old saying goes that, "to secure peace is to prepare for war," and it remains as accurate today as it was when it was coined. American needs to be ready to fight wars on two fronts. Only these are not the fronts of western and eastern, or Pacific and Atlantic. These are the fronts of conventional and unconventional warfare.
America has oft made the mistake of downsizing her military when things "seemed safe," usually after the conclusion of a large or protracted war. And, every single time she's done that, she's had to remobilize. Every single time. Bar none.
I assure you, that pattern will not change.
The danger here is that we might make the mistake of downsizing while currently engaged in combat zones. Yes, one can argue that downsizing now would be an effective way of forcing ourselves out of the conflicts we are in, but, regardless of politics, that would be a serious mistake.
Terrorism isn't going anywhere. Trust me, it's not. As long as people somewhere, anywhere, disagree with other people, terrorism and guerrilla warfare will exist. Somewhat thankfully, our government and our military realize this, and our armed forces are transitioning themselves to fight such wars (what the Pentagon painstakingly refers to as "long wars"). This is fine, for we need that capability.
However, we're placing too much emphasis on the so-called "long wars." And we're doing so at the expense of our ability to fight conventional ones.
Russia is clearly staring NATO in the face, waiting for NATO to blink. China is clearly preparing itself to do the very same thing. And what's our response? To downsize.
Already, the Navy has canceled its admittedly ambitious 21st Century destroyer program, and the Army is cutting funding for its Future Combat Systems. Of the FCS, the portions of it that aren't getting the axe are primarily geared for, you guessed it, "long war" operations.
Most people don't seem to realize exactly how small our military has become. Yes, for a number of years, it was probably too big, but no longer. In the 1980s, the military was nearly 600 ships and over 30 combat divisions (including reserve forces). Today, the Navy stands at just over 200 combat ships, and 18 combat divisions (10 active, 8 national guard). Simply put, we don't have enough manpower to do anything.
Both the Russian and Chinese navies are growing, with each indicating that they are constructing new aircraft carriers to support blue water operations. Already, both the Russian and Chinese armies outnumber ours by an alarmingly disproportionate amount. And we're not talking combined, mind you. Including organized reserves, each outnumbers us on their own.
The solution is obvious, though expensive. Cut the fat out of the programs that have obvious fat, but don't further shrink America's military. In fact, grow it. This can be partially funded by doing away with the independent Air Force as well as taking the Marine Corps away from the Navy. The rest can be funded by slicing the fat from those programs that need it.
We need "long war" capability. That is clear. But we also need conventional capability, for at least as long as Russia and China remain possible enemies. For those critics who feel China poses little threat, please inform me exactly why they're expanding their military at a rate rivaled in the past 100 years by only the mobilization efforts of World War II.
Let's not be stupid, here. Let's secure peace.
Unfortunately, to do that, we must prepare for war.
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
The Tet Offensive: Warnings for Iraq
We lost the Vietnam War. Of this, there is no doubt. But we could have won. Oh, yes, we could have won.
The war, though far from smooth, had by 1968 become manageable in the eyes of the US military. Several semi-permanent bases had been established by the DMZ between North and South Vietnam. One in particular, Khe Sanh, was established close enough to the Laotian border as to serve as a relatively effective striking point to hit the famed Ho Chi Minh trail. Just when things were looking up, the unthinkable happened:
The Tet Offensive.
Despite being, by all rights, a military failure of the North Vietnamese, and successfully repelled by the Americans and their allies, the sheer magnitude of the offensive shocked almost everyone. Millions of Americans watched on TV as Walter Cronkite turned his back on the war, convincing those Americans to do the same. General Westmoreland, until then the commander of American forces in Vietnam, was replaced by General Abrams. What followed was a change in American strategy.
After Tet was subdued, American leadership decided to shift from trying to win the war with American military forces to trying to win the war by training and supplying the South Vietnamese forces to operate independently and defend themselves.
Stop me if this sounds familiar.
The result we all know too well. By 1973, American intervention in the war was effectively over and, in 1975, South Vietnam would fall to the North. Not exactly the end we were hoping for.
While no doubt arguable, there is little doubt in this author's mind that Vietnam could have been won (or, at least, not lost) had the American home front not waned in its support for the war. But the Tet Offensive would provide most Americans with the ultimate image of the war, and that image was a bad one.
Ironically, as mentioned earlier, the Tet Offensive was a success for the American forces. Out of the hundreds of targets attacked by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong during the offensive, none were successfully occupied for more than a month. Even the American base at Khe Sanh, despite a continuous assault by the North Vietnamese, remained in American hands until General Abrams ordered it destroyed and evacuated after six months of battle. Another little known fact about the supression of the Tet Offensive was that the Viet Cong was essentially destroyed as an effective fighting force. The shift in American policy to passive intervention is what allowed the VC to rise to power once again.
Whether or not the Vietnam War was a just cause is not the issue here. For this thesis, that issue is completely irrelevant. What is relevant is that the loss of Vietnam was a direct result of the shift from a malignant American military to a benign one. The shift from fighting for and with the South Vietnamese to simply supporting the South Vietnamese.
Again, sound familiar?
Whether or not the Iraq War is a just cause is not the issue here. What is the issue is what's going to happen after we leave. If done too early, we're doomed to repeat the experience in Vietnam. Politics aside, is that really what we want?
The war, though far from smooth, had by 1968 become manageable in the eyes of the US military. Several semi-permanent bases had been established by the DMZ between North and South Vietnam. One in particular, Khe Sanh, was established close enough to the Laotian border as to serve as a relatively effective striking point to hit the famed Ho Chi Minh trail. Just when things were looking up, the unthinkable happened:
The Tet Offensive.
Despite being, by all rights, a military failure of the North Vietnamese, and successfully repelled by the Americans and their allies, the sheer magnitude of the offensive shocked almost everyone. Millions of Americans watched on TV as Walter Cronkite turned his back on the war, convincing those Americans to do the same. General Westmoreland, until then the commander of American forces in Vietnam, was replaced by General Abrams. What followed was a change in American strategy.
After Tet was subdued, American leadership decided to shift from trying to win the war with American military forces to trying to win the war by training and supplying the South Vietnamese forces to operate independently and defend themselves.
Stop me if this sounds familiar.
The result we all know too well. By 1973, American intervention in the war was effectively over and, in 1975, South Vietnam would fall to the North. Not exactly the end we were hoping for.
While no doubt arguable, there is little doubt in this author's mind that Vietnam could have been won (or, at least, not lost) had the American home front not waned in its support for the war. But the Tet Offensive would provide most Americans with the ultimate image of the war, and that image was a bad one.
Ironically, as mentioned earlier, the Tet Offensive was a success for the American forces. Out of the hundreds of targets attacked by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong during the offensive, none were successfully occupied for more than a month. Even the American base at Khe Sanh, despite a continuous assault by the North Vietnamese, remained in American hands until General Abrams ordered it destroyed and evacuated after six months of battle. Another little known fact about the supression of the Tet Offensive was that the Viet Cong was essentially destroyed as an effective fighting force. The shift in American policy to passive intervention is what allowed the VC to rise to power once again.
Whether or not the Vietnam War was a just cause is not the issue here. For this thesis, that issue is completely irrelevant. What is relevant is that the loss of Vietnam was a direct result of the shift from a malignant American military to a benign one. The shift from fighting for and with the South Vietnamese to simply supporting the South Vietnamese.
Again, sound familiar?
Whether or not the Iraq War is a just cause is not the issue here. What is the issue is what's going to happen after we leave. If done too early, we're doomed to repeat the experience in Vietnam. Politics aside, is that really what we want?
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