Military Fakers

Recently, I was introduced to the YouTube channel of Don Shipley, a former Navy SEAL who spends a great deal of his time exposing people who pretend they were Navy SEALs (as well as fake veterans in general). Shipley cracks me up. And he's awesome.

I despise frauds. Particularly these frauds. You want to brag about having been in the military? Then join the military. You want to brag about having been in special operations? Then try out and make a special operations unit or team. Seriously.

Anyway, I've decided to rant about three personal experiences I've had with "fake soldiers," just to share. I won't name names (I actually don't know two of them), but I'll tell you how it all went down.

First, though, let me tell you that I'm a veteran. I have just over 9 years of total military service. And let me tell you that my military career was pretty uneventful. I didn't do anything significant or of consequence. Nothing really out of the ordinary happened while I was in. I was, effectively, a glorified janitor at times and a glorified clerk at other times. That's about the gist of it.

That out of the way, let's get on to the show.

The first dude was innocent enough. It happened in Wilmington, North Carolina. A young aspiring film effects guy who, as we were helping a buddy of mine with a commercial for a website, happened to notice a C-130 flying by. He looked up and mentioned that he used to push air drops out of those things. I asked when. He replied, "With the Army."

Now, this kid was young. He was overweight. He had hardware sticking out of his lips, nose, and other parts of his face. None of those are necessarily disqualifiers for having been a veteran by themselves, but all three in the form of one dude certainly piqued my curiosity. Keep in mind that, at the time, I had fairly long hair (nobody pegs me for being a veteran).

I asked if he was a paratrooper. He said no. I asked if he went to AALPS (which is the Army course that teaches how to load an aircraft). He had no clue what that was. So, finally, I asked him when he was in the fucking Army while letting him know that I'd served. He seemed incredulous, then fessed up immediately that he'd been on a C-130 once. While in high school. As an Army JROTC cadet. And he got to touch a door bundle before real crew chiefs and jumpmasters pushed it out of the plane.

Yeah...

The next dude surprises even me a bit. This guy really is a veteran. A Purple Heart recipient, at that. He is Ranger qualified (no small feat) and served in a LRS (long-range scout) unit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He's also someone who doesn't like me very much, so he let it be known that he was a former Delta Force operator who was looking to kick my ass. Delta Force. The American version of the SAS. Bad-asses of the bad-asses.

A fight did occur between us. I elbowed him in the neck and threw him into a table. In less than two seconds. Sorry, but any real Delta Operator would've fucked me up before I even knew what hit me. Not only that, he claims that there's "no such thing as a declassified identity," and that the military calls it a "debrief." Uh, yeah... two different animals, moron. Google Valerie Plame or any other operative or operator whose identities have been made public. Ooh... what's the term they use? Yeah, "declassified."

Douchebag.

All that aside, it's the final guy on my list that really gets me going. This also happened in Wilmington, North Carolina, at a bar by the beach (actually, it was Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, but close enough). One of my old soldiers and good friends was down for a visit from Fort Bragg, and we were enjoying a few drinks in the summer heat. To my right was an older fellow, fairly stocky, certainly loud as all get-out, wearing a sleeveless shirt with "Navy SEAL" emblazoned on the front of it.

Well, I've got mad respect for SEALs (and Green Berets, and Operators, and...) and I wanted to strike up a conversation. So I asked, "You were a SEAL?"

His response: "No, I got this shirt at a fucking gas station."

Yeah, it was heavy on the sarcasm, like I was some fucking moron. But I happen to be a moron who can spot a faker from a mile away. So I followed up with another question: "When were you in Coronado?"

Before I share his response, Coronado (for those who don't know) is where BUD/S (Basic Underwater Demolition / SEAL) training takes place. Every SEAL goes there. Every SEAL's gone there for years. I grew up in the area. That's how I know this.

Where was I? Oh, yeah... his response: "Where?" I repeated to ensure that he heard me. I don't think the idiot's ever even been to San Diego.

So, I tapped my buddy on the shoulder and informed him we had a fake SEAL in our midst. Oddly enough, some of the other patrons in the bar were marines from Camp LeJeune enjoying some time off. Even better, the fake SEAL had been hitting on some woman who, obviously, suddenly became unimpressed.

Asshole.

Sorry for such an unorganized rant. But these jerks piss me off.

Don't Ask, Don't Tell: An Opinion

If you can believe it (and of course you can), people once opposed blacks in the US military. They also opposed American aborigines in the military. And Jews. And women. And... yeah, pretty much anyone who wasn't a white male Christian. Oh, and a heterosexual one, at that.

Let me just get this out of the way: repeal "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." It's pointless, most troops don't really give a shit what other troops do off-duty, and countless other militaries have allowed gays, faggots, dykes, lesbos, carpet-munchers, pillow-biters, flesh-sword exchangers, and muff-muff scissor-lockers for years.

So why don't we?

I'm a veteran. I am not gay. I served with several gays who, though they eventually confided in me (among others), were outstanding soldiers who never bothered anybody. Sure, there was an initial shock at their revelations, but that subsided quickly (usually before the end of the conversation). But, so what? It didn't affect their ability to serve in the military at all. Except that they had to be a little extra cautious when off-duty. In that sense, it probably affected their ability to serve in a negative manner.

When I was younger, I must admit, I pretended to dislike homosexuals. It was, after all, the "cool" thing to do. So, yeah, I openly berated them. Behind closed doors, however (closets! Nyer!), I didn't give a shit. I still don't. I honestly don't care. I don't support gay marriage, but neither do I oppose it. I just don't care.

Where I do care lies in the fact that we need good soldiers, sailors, and marines. And we need soldiers, sailors, and marines who actually want to serve. So why not let them?

An aside: While I'm on the subject of letting everyone serve openly, I figured I'd mention that I also support women in the combat specialties, which are still primarily closed to females (if they're willing to take a bullet, who am I to tell them they can't?).

Okay, back on topic. Let gays serve. They want to. We need personnel. What's the fucking problem?

Some facts for you:

• In 1947, most military personnel claimed that integrating blacks and Jews would cause riots in the military. It didn't.
• In the 1980s, many military personnel claimed that allowing women to more fully integrate in the military (primarily on Navy vessels) would cause too many problems to be worth it. Yes, there were some hiccups, but overwhelming disruption there was not.
• Today, some claim that allowing gays to serve will do the same. I got news for you: it won't.

Let 'em serve. That is all.

Men and Trees

Talbot was a huge college basketball fan, having attended USC when George Raveling was the coach there. Because of Raveling, Talbot referred to his men on the ground as "The Football Team." They were the doers, the go-getters, the men who would do what they were told when they were told whether they liked it or not. Nothing happened without the Football Team, Talbot knew, and he meant no disrespect by it.

Still, everything started with the men and women who sat in cubicles in front of computer screens with statistics, analysis, and spreadsheets galore spread out on their desks. They were a messy bunch, the ones Talbot referred to as "The Basketball Team," and it reminded of Talbot's days as an engineering assistant way back in the day. Engineers, by their very nature, are only organized in their minds. In practice, however, they're complete slobs... important schematics on the floor, usually marked with a ring of coffee that spilled over from never-washed coffee cups. And the Basketball Team was no different. But it was their understanding of administration, history, strategy, and their ability to interpret gathered intelligence - and interpret it well - that always got the ball rolling.

Like many on the Basketball Team, Talbot was jealous of the physical prowess of his football players, but here in his air conditioned office - thousands of miles away from where his quarterbacks, linebackers, offensive line and free safeties places themselves in lines of danger - Talbot wouldn't have it any other way. He ran things, after all, and though the glory went to those who scored the touchdowns, his pay scale and the fact he saw his family almost every night kept his envy in check.

"Someone give me a weather report," Talbot ordered.

"Hot," an analyst replied. The room echoed subdued laughter. Talbot held back a smile, though the joke was expected. Things were too serious at the moment and, though he did want to laugh, this was no time for humor.

"You the weather man, Adams?" Talbot scolded, his quiet-angry expression on his face. It was a false expression, to be sure, but his basketball players knew Talbot well enough by now to know that everyone should be concentrated on business. They can save the comedic relief for later.

"No, sir."

Harding, who was the weather man, despite her gender, spoke up. "Temperature is 92 degrees Fahrenheit at the moment, but will drop to about 45 degrees tonight. Monsoon season is having a minimal effect on the operational area and humidity remains low."

Talbot frowned. The temperature extremes would not normally be a problem, but it meant that his football players had to pack both hot and cold-weather clothing, which means they were carrying more weight than they would have liked. And those boys still had an awful lot of ground to cover.

"How far did they get in the last 24?"

"35 kilometers," Adams responded, knowing he hadn't really been scolded. If anything, Talbot hated to make his team members, basketball, football, or otherwise, feel negative emotions during an operation. The operations had tendencies to do that on their own. Especially this one. Dawson, one of the football players - his quarterback, in fact - had called it a suicide mission, and Talbot had secretly agreed with him. But the orders came from way up the food chain, and no one could do anything about it. There were American spies who needed to be extracted very quickly. Washington was in a race with Beijing, and the information those spies had gathered deemed everyone else expendable... especially the football team.

***

Dawson strapped himself into the MH-60 as the crew chief slid the door closed. Not having a chance to earlier, he took a better look at the two operatives his team had picked up. A man and woman posing as a married couple, both spoke fluent Cantonese and Mandarin, was well as their native languages. The man was of Korean descent - Dawson could tell by the lighter skin tone and the shape of the head - and the woman was Taiwanese-Japanese, on loan from Taipei's secret service. Dawson picked up on her Japanese immediately, but only a note from the intelligence report let him know that she was Taiwanese and not mainland Chinese. He knew that neither operative could tell him what they had discovered, but he hoped that it was worth it.

The extraction had gone well... on time, on location, and completely according to plan. It was the getting there that had been a problem. A persistent Chinese patrol had run into the football team last night, just after dusk, and the ensuing firefight lit up the sky and seemingly extended the day for another 87 minutes. Dawson turned around, glancing at the lifeless bodies of his two linebackers and his guard. He would write three letters when they reached their debriefing destination - Camp Zama, Japan, by way of Inchon, South Korea - but he knew that those letters would never be read. Some office geek... some basketball player... would write the letters that would actually be delivered to the families. Letters from someone who didn't even know those men, ostensibly from a conventional unit that those men had never belonged to.

Dawson sighed, exhausted from the ordeal. One day, he'd have to put in his transfer to basketball.

***

"When I went to Catholic high school in Philadelphia, we just had one coach for football and basketball. He took all of us who turned out and had us run through a forest. The ones who ran into the trees were on the football team." - George Raveling

Better Than Never

*a sequel to Coldscapes

He hates seduction. Despises it, in fact. It always makes him feel dirty. But, someone somewhere sometime, as the old saying goes, decided that he was too attractive not to be assigned to details that somehow always involve women. He loves his country, to be sure, but he is married to his college sweetheart, and the "national defense" excuse is wearing thin.

If all had gone according to plan, he would've been done with the human intelligence portion of the operation, having already mined the woman for information. She was a beautiful woman and, let him be honest, it had made things easier. Still, he thought he was done with the raven-haired, pale-skinned Russian whose parents were born in Lithuanian. But the team he had sent out missed their last two check-ins.

She's more than happy to see him lying next to her as she wakes up in the hotel room in Mytishchi, just outside of Moskva to the northeast. She's falling in love with her mysterious Canadian businessman. He had told her he was a salesman of precious metals, but she knew enough about the game to know that this was not the case. In fact, she was sure he was American, though his mastery of French - as well as the Montreal accent - made her doubt her conclusion. Still, she was rather inexperienced overall, and even though the FSB briefed her many times to not discuss work with strangers - particularly attractive ones - she couldn't help herself. He looks at her so longingly, though perhaps not lovingly, when she talks about work. He always seems impressed with her responsibilities as a mere secretary and would even joke that she was probably more than just.

"How did you get off of work today?" he asks, gently rubbing her shoulders.

She rolls over to face him, giving him a lustful look. "My boss had to leave yesterday, so I have nothing to do."

He returns the gaze and leans in for a kiss. "Ah, the always pleasant supervisor emergencies." The irony is not lost on him.

She kisses him back. "Yes."

He withholds a sigh. He doesn't have time for this. Every second that goes by is another second closer to failure, and that was no option. Despite himself, or possibly in spite of himself, he rolls himself on top of her and does the very thing he had been trained effectively at doing.

By the time they were done, he knew where he needed to be.

***

Sporadic gunfire hides the sound of snowmobile as he races it through the Russian forest. He can tell that most of the weapons are of Soviet make, but there's at least one American-made carbine spitting bullets among the din.

Only one? If that's the case, then there might not be anybody to extract by the time he joins the fray. Were he to follow protocol, he would be heading to the exfiltration point and waiting a short period of time. If nobody shows, then he would leave and that would be the end of that. Protocol most certainly does not provide for him to drive towards the sounds of battle. But these were his boys; he sent them here. To this cold, miserable place.

As he gets closer he realizes for certain that, yes, there is only one American here. He has no idea if the rest are simply elsewhere, but instinct tells him that they're probably all dead. A fire-team of Russian soldiers finally notices the snowmobile and they turn to engage him. He smiles as he squeezes the trigger on his HK. Too late... for them. Before anyone else can bring their weapons to bear on the vehicle, he ditches it and flings himself into the snow. If he had gauged their positions correctly, he and the surviving American should be to the Russians' flanks. If one could refer to single shooters as flankers, that is.

Still, it's enough. As the last Russian goes down, yelling something in Nogai, everything goes ghostly quiet. There's the faint echo of a snowmobile idling somewhere, but he doesn't bother to locate it. Instead, he turns his attention to the American. He notices that the scope is missing off the American's carbine, then notices that the soldier is limping.

"Where are the others?" he calls out.

"Dead. I'm it." The soldier nods towards the snowmobile in the distance. "Is that our ride?"

"Yep."

"You're late."

He laughs, tired. "Yeah, well..."

Lost In Transcription, Part I - Returning Home

Well, what a year this is. Not two months ago, I expressed the following sentiment: "Don't see myself going active ever again, however, as I really enjoy not wearing a uniform every day. Funerals got a bit too much to handle, too. No more combat arms for me." Funny, then, that I'm now in the process of going back in.

Lying to oneself is a familiar game, I suppose, and nobody who really knows me is surprised at all by the revelation. One of my closest friends likes to point out that I never should have gotten out, since my conscience doesn't handle "not being there" very well. But, seriously, how the Hell was I supposed to know that at the time? It's not like I had a wealth of experience to draw from prior to the first time I joined the military... which was pretty much straight out of high school.

I'm fairly amused by the reactions of friends and family alike. Many former Army supervisors and subordinates responded to the news with unexpected encouragement. I hesitate to claim that I was usually among the best at my job, but quite a few will claim that for me despite my personal misgivings. Still, I wasn't the best soldier as far as adhering to the system goes, and even I'm not so blasé as to not feel a bit flattered by the response.

Naturally, my film/TV industry buddies are against the idea, as are many of my writers. There are a few with the misconception that I'm some artistic talent going to waste, but, let's be real... have I really written or produced anything worth a shit? As far as my writers, yes, there has been quite a bit headway in getting them published, but I'm pretty sure their fear in my returning to uniform lies in the idea that I won't be able to edit and distribute their writing. Sure, I won't be doing it 24 hours a day, but I'll still be around. Red pen and harsh criticism shall be standing by, I assure you.

All that stated, even I'm a big flabbergasted by the relative abandon with which I'm once again pursuing a military career. I'm doing everything I can to clear waivers (I need one for my age... go figure... and one for my oft-broken foot) and am trying to shed as many emotional attachments to my civilian existence as possible. One thing I did know when I got out the Army the first time was that I don't suffer deployment well if my mind is elsewhere.

And therein exists the problem. I have five wonderful pets, and leaving them (even if temporarily) is going to suck. But some things must be done, however undesirable.

There I go again... lying to myself. I'll be able to handle the pets; I've done that before. It's the woman I've been waiting for my entire life that's fucking things up.

Mountain Warfare: An American Oversight

As a superpower with global reach and concerns, our military is trained, equipped, and prepared to go anywhere anytime the need arises. Almost. While we are no doubt prepared for desert-based conflicts and have increased our urban warfare capabilities exponentially since the 1990s, we lack a particular capability that is particularly important today, given our involvement in Afghanistan: mountain warfare.

Wait, what?

Yes, you read that right. Our mountain warfare infrastructure leaves something to be desired. Simply put, we have no units that maintain an at-ready status to deploy to mountainous territories. And this is despite having a "mountain division" on active Army rolls.

Not unsurprisingly, a third-party analysis of American mountain warfare capabilities revealed a serious lack of immediacy in the United States Army and United States Marine Corps' mountain readiness. The analysis was written by an officer in the Pakistani Army back in 2004, and seems to have gone unnoticed by American military planners of then and now.

Strangely, the US military maintains three very effective "mountain warfare" schools, two run by the Army and one by the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, each of these schools maintain emphases on mountaineering, rather than the physical action of combat in mountainous terrain. Sure, the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center conducts a field exercise of sorts, but little of it entails running operations of any significant longevity, and almost completely ignores the problems of resupply and heavy logistics. Critics could even easily claim that the field exercise is barely more than a simple game of laser tag. And no combat units are stationed at the post (Pickel Meadow, California).

Of the two Army mountain warfare courses, one, the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, is more dedicated to cold weather operations (obviously) and conducts their mountaineering training near the Black Rapids Glacier. The other, the Army's formal Mountain Warfare School, is located in Jericho, Vermont, amid the foothills of the Green Mountains. Again, neither post maintains an active mountain warfare unit.

Which brings us to the Army's vaunted (sort of) 10th Mountain Division. Inactive since 1958 (when it was a simple infantry division), it was reactivated in 1985 due to Reagan's insistence on having an alpine division. Ironically, some genius in the Army think-tank decided to garrison the division at Fort Drum, New York. A nice, flat strip of acreage located a whopping 200 feet above sea level. You know, the perfect elevation to keep soldiers acclimated to fighting in high elevations. Worse still, the post is located roughly 80 miles from the highest peaks of the Adirondacks, which include Mount Marcy (approximately 5300 feet) and Algonquin Peak (approximately 5100 feet). While these peaks certainly make for excellent training, once again, no combat units are permanently stationed at those elevations.

Historically, the 10th Mountain Division formed and trained for World War II at Camp Hale, Colorado, almost 9,000 feet above sea level. Located within the Camp's borders was Copper Mountain, whose peak sits at over 12,000 feet. An ideal location to train and breed mountain soldiers, undoubtedly. Unfortunately, Hale is no longer an active military post, so the current Army lacks its option.

Still, Colorado does lay claim to another prominent Army fort, Fort Carson, which rests nicely at about 6,000 feet. Nearby are Cheyenne Mountain (about 9,500 feet) and Pike's Peak (over 14,000 feet). Yet another ideal location to train and breed mountain soldiers.

But, guess what? The division the Army maintains at Carson is not a mountain warfare division, but an armored division: the 4th Infantry Division (armored by MTOE - modified table of organization and equipment). Because, you know, tankers need to be acclimated to drive through hazardous mountain ranges.

The end result is that no unit deploying to the mountain regions of Afghanistan, or anywhere else, is pre-acclimated to the altitudes necessary to operate effectively. Yes, the men and women of our armed forces do a wonderful job of toughing things out until their lungs and muscles adjust to the lower temperatures and levels of oxygen, but why should they have to?

Honestly, does that make any logical sense to anybody? Why make things harder on our soldiers and marines than they are already are?

If someone in the Pentagon would think about for it for more than brief moment, they'd come up with the easy solution: switch the locations of the 4th ID and the 10th Mountain. Hell, other than shipping a few vehicles back and forth, all it would require are a few flag changes and soldiers switching out their uniform patches. And, let's be fair, the opening of a new mountain warfare school. But one that actually teaches the "warfare" part.

Think the Department of Defense can handle that?

The Beholders

Hollywood gets it wrong when movies talk about itchy trigger fingers. Of course, how would they know? An industry populated by writers whose research methods consist almost entirely of peripheral methods. Peripheral as in: ask someone... the first person who even remotely answers like they know what they're talking about, well, that's what gets run with.

Anyone who does know knows that it's not the trigger finger that gets itchy; it's the thumb on the safety. The trigger finger's too stupid to know when it's itchy or not. It just knows it's married to the trigger and pulls whenever it feels like it, itch be damned. But the thumb, that's the extension of the hand that needs to think. In order words, the trigger finger's just the cock, reacting to pornographic input the thumb has to sift through. If and when to blow a wad is the key to survival out here.

What a strange thing to be thinking of when riding in the driver's side rear seat of a stripped-down Army Humvee. A deadly joyride through the middle of a seemingly alien desert valley in the wrong part of the world. In front, a driver's white-knuckles signal a nervousness from traversing this rather dangerous place one too many times. To the driver's right, a vehicle commander's floating head betrays a concerted attempt to try not to let fear put him to sleep.

Funny, that. How soldiers can turn fear into a stimulus to hit the sack. Then again, soldiers can turn anything into a stimulus to hit the sack. Next to sex, sleep has always been a soldier's best friend. But not today; not now.

A quick tap to the driver's left shoulder; the driver notices the vehicle commander and purposefully swerves the steering wheel. The violence of the Humvee attempting to change direction shakes the vehicle commander awake. The VC looks at the driver, nods a cursory thank you, then returns a weary gaze to the landscape.

The thought occurs that there's no place on Earth that isn't beautiful. Even here, where the constant reminder of dust and sand pelting the face serve an ironic counterpoint to the serenity of snow-capped mountains seen in the distance. A false serenity, naturally, as the snows of those mountains are too often stained with blood. For whatever reason, there's no sight as shocking as bright red arterial spray littering a carpet of white snow.

Hollywood, however, loves the image. After all, it provides such a beautiful contrast of colors for people to gaze in awe at. A small, lovely pattern hidden in the ugly tapestry of war, or so the self-professed artists of the industry would have their audiences believe.

That's another thing Hollywood gets wrong. Through the flash of a rocket-propelled grenade fired from behind a rock formation, the perceived slowing of time, the itch of a thumb as it decides to let a finger seduce a trigger, and the screams of panic and defiance of friends as they prepare to discover if they'll ever see snow up close again... Hollywood gets it wrong.

War is beautiful.

The Tightrope

Operationally, everything was still fine. Most of the physical pieces were still in play, and the world was still around. At least so far.

It was when the plan was scrutinized that everything revealed itself to be fucked up beyond all recognition. The logistics were gone. The supplier, and the supply line with her, disappeared into the urban jungle with a simple note containing an apologetic explanation and a veiled threat. This, naturally, meant the strategy would have to be altered. But by whom?

He was, by this point, extremely tired and had little fight left in him. His ability to give a shit had been dulled by needless tangents and unnecessary reinforcement actions. He was far from home, surrounded mostly by enemies and strangers, and longed for a familial touch.

The problem there was that his family no longer knew who he was or even what he did. Worse, the reverse was true. Decades apart will do that.

Giving up was a viable option. He had never surrendered before. Not once in his life. But, as the saying goes, there is a first time for everything. Continuing on was still an option, albeit one seemingly too far out of reach. In addition to finding a new source of supplies, a new strategy would have to be conceived; new tactics would have to be researched and practiced. But he was running out of time.

Quite similar to the famous examples of Rommel and Patton, he had, simply, outrun the rest of his supply line. He was so far forward of the staging area, and so deep undercover, that even if he had snapped his fingers no one would respond, for they wouldn't know who he was or what he was doing there.

Hell, even he didn't know what he was doing there. Partially forced, and partially inclined, he wound up in a place he swore never to return to. Partially because he was the best at what he did, and partially because no one else was available.

It was a game of fate. A tightrope. One he had walked for far too long. And he was tired.

In humans, balance is the sixth sense. Originating in the inner ear, it is enhanced by vision. Without vision, it would be impossible for a man on a tightrope to balance himself. A blind man might be able to stay upright for a few moments, but would undoubtedly fall. Perhaps he would fall at an angle that would allow him to grab the robe, or even entangle himself in it. But, more likely, he would simply fall to his death.

He checked his weapons, just in case. He ensured his personal equipment still functioned and were in good order. As in all things, what comes next is never truly known, and it is wise to prepare as best as one can. Should he continue the operation? Should he turn tail and run? Or should he simply lick his wounds and hope for the best? Many options presented themselves, and he preferred none of them.

So completely unsure of what to do as he stood on that tightrope, he did the only thing that came to mind.

He closed his eyes.

Military Development: The Lost Art

The procurement and development budget Department of Defense is under fire; this is no secret. The incoming administration wants to increase that amount of fire; this is also no secret. Experts are expecting several projects, such as the F-22, the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS), and most of the Navy's new surface combatant programs to be cut heavily or, worse, canceled outright.

This would be, in my opinion, as stupid as stupid gets.

To be fair, however, DoD brought this on itself as much as any external force of pressure. Since the heyday of World War II, DoD's ability to procure and develop systems, while remaining impressive, has endured a severe loss of quality and effectiveness. Simply put: we don't do it like we used to.

More and more of DoD's design and development happens out-of-house. That is, not under the direct control of the Department of Defense. While this is very much an American capitalist ideal, it is not necessarily the best way to run things. In fact, the DoD should almost inarguably be the one department of our government that is 100% self-sufficient. Defense should not rely on anyone other than the defenders. That being stated, external input should always be welcomed.

There is also the American propensity to want to make "leaps and bounds" in technology before implementing improvements. In other words, we like waiting for the next big thing, rather than enduring the purchases of several stages of "little things." Economists might tell you this is the reason the Japanese overtook us in electronics and automobiles, and they would be right. This attitude of "bigger, better, now" is also what's hurting our military. And, again, we can point to the heyday of World War II.

You see, in the 1930s, 40s, and even the 50s, weapons systems obsolesced insanely quickly. Some within a year of being fielded. While most of us find that an incomprehensible concept, we would only have to look at modern computer development to find a contemporary example of such a phenomenon. While the WWII-era system of procurement and development was by no means cheap, it was wholly effective, and set the stage for our rapid advancement through the 1970s, the last great era for design and development until now.

Yes, systems were purchased and then "thrown away" quickly. But those throw-aways had benefit. They provided us with ample material to recycle, an excess of quality training tools, and, in their most important roles, served as test-beds for countless technological innovations (some major, some minor). We no longer have that capability today.

And why not? Well, bureacracy and politics. Every politician and general or admiral wants to be able to put their "stamp" on a particular system. Which means every politician and general or admiral naturally avoids the "small scale" innovations that could keep our procurement process cheap, yet continuously evolving in the field, and not just in the lab.

Take, for instance, the new rail gun system the Navy wants to field by 2025. The truth of the matter is that the Navy could field one tomorrow. But they would have to combine an old technology with a new one, and relegate their ultimate goal of "a new gun on a new ship" to a secondary goal.

The current rail guns can feasibly be mounted on a battleship. No, they're not as powerful as the Navy wants, but they're as powerful or more powerful than most of the other gun systems found in the world today. And we could test them in the field.

Instead, the Navy seems content with lab-testing a rail gun, waiting 10-years until the system is small and efficient enough to be mounted on a destroyer (of probably a new build or design), and then send it out into the world... without the data we could be accumulating by putting one of these bad boys on a battleship.

Mark my words: implementing the so-called "final design" of these rail guns will become far, far more expensive than currently expected because of our indirect policy of waiting. Just look at the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Bloated design and development; horrendously overbudget. Look at the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Bloated design and development; horrendously overbudget. Hell, our Air Force can't even procure a new mid-air refueler with any semblance of an efficient process. And, yet, in World War II, we had weapons systems go from idea, to drawing board, to construction, to deployment in less than a year.

But we don't like looking to the past, and we certainly don't like making small, seemingly insignificant improvements. It takes too long. The end result seems less important. Nobody can try to take all of the credit. And Al Gore invented the Internet.

Seriously, we have weapons systems still in use today that were in service 30, or even 40, years ago. And why? Because those weapons systems are constantly upgraded at a consistent pace. But nobody notices. Even the services themselves seem less interested in fixing up older systems. It's not "sexy." The new shit is.

Well, sexier don't mean better.

A Two-War Military

We are, without doubt, on the cusp of yet another "brave, new world." The global environment seems to be changing at a faster pace than with the post-World War II independence movements. New safe harbors are popping up, as are new dangerous waters. And, as we approach the adolescent years of the 21st Century, an old superpower is once again flexing its arms, and an ancient superpower is waking from its centuries-long slumber.

On top of all that, terrorism has taken on a new life. No longer dedicated regional acts of violence, terrorism has walked on the world's stage as a superpower unto itself. And American needs to be prepared.

The old saying goes that, "to secure peace is to prepare for war," and it remains as accurate today as it was when it was coined. American needs to be ready to fight wars on two fronts. Only these are not the fronts of western and eastern, or Pacific and Atlantic. These are the fronts of conventional and unconventional warfare.

America has oft made the mistake of downsizing her military when things "seemed safe," usually after the conclusion of a large or protracted war. And, every single time she's done that, she's had to remobilize. Every single time. Bar none.

I assure you, that pattern will not change.

The danger here is that we might make the mistake of downsizing while currently engaged in combat zones. Yes, one can argue that downsizing now would be an effective way of forcing ourselves out of the conflicts we are in, but, regardless of politics, that would be a serious mistake.

Terrorism isn't going anywhere. Trust me, it's not. As long as people somewhere, anywhere, disagree with other people, terrorism and guerrilla warfare will exist. Somewhat thankfully, our government and our military realize this, and our armed forces are transitioning themselves to fight such wars (what the Pentagon painstakingly refers to as "long wars"). This is fine, for we need that capability.

However, we're placing too much emphasis on the so-called "long wars." And we're doing so at the expense of our ability to fight conventional ones.

Russia is clearly staring NATO in the face, waiting for NATO to blink. China is clearly preparing itself to do the very same thing. And what's our response? To downsize.

Already, the Navy has canceled its admittedly ambitious 21st Century destroyer program, and the Army is cutting funding for its Future Combat Systems. Of the FCS, the portions of it that aren't getting the axe are primarily geared for, you guessed it, "long war" operations.

Most people don't seem to realize exactly how small our military has become. Yes, for a number of years, it was probably too big, but no longer. In the 1980s, the military was nearly 600 ships and over 30 combat divisions (including reserve forces). Today, the Navy stands at just over 200 combat ships, and 18 combat divisions (10 active, 8 national guard). Simply put, we don't have enough manpower to do anything.

Both the Russian and Chinese navies are growing, with each indicating that they are constructing new aircraft carriers to support blue water operations. Already, both the Russian and Chinese armies outnumber ours by an alarmingly disproportionate amount. And we're not talking combined, mind you. Including organized reserves, each outnumbers us on their own.

The solution is obvious, though expensive. Cut the fat out of the programs that have obvious fat, but don't further shrink America's military. In fact, grow it. This can be partially funded by doing away with the independent Air Force as well as taking the Marine Corps away from the Navy. The rest can be funded by slicing the fat from those programs that need it.

We need "long war" capability. That is clear. But we also need conventional capability, for at least as long as Russia and China remain possible enemies. For those critics who feel China poses little threat, please inform me exactly why they're expanding their military at a rate rivaled in the past 100 years by only the mobilization efforts of World War II.

Let's not be stupid, here. Let's secure peace.

Unfortunately, to do that, we must prepare for war.

Divisions of the United States Army

The following is an entry I wrote for Wikipedia a while back. I'll be editing it for format as the week progresses. I apologize in advance for any errors as other Wikipedia assholes liked to fuck with the article.

Divisions of the United States Army

This list of United States Army Divisions is divided into three eras: 1911-1917, 1917-1941, and 1941-present. These eras represent the major evolutions of Army division structure (there have been several minor changes during these times). The 1911-1917 era lists divisions raised during the Army's first attempts at modernizing the division, prior to the authorization of permanent divisions, and the 1917-1941 era lists the first permanent divisions, prior to advent of specialized (Armored, Airborne, etc.,) divisions. The 1941-present era lists all of the divisions organized, raised, or authorized since then.

As much as possible, divisions are only listed in the eras in which they were first created. Some divisions, such as the 1st Cavalry Division, are listed in multiple eras, as their organizations were drastically changed from one era to the next. Many divisions overlap the years listed in the era categories, mainly due to the slow pace in which they were deactivated, inactivated, or otherwise disbanded.

It should also be noted that several divisions have existed under multiple designations, such as the 10th Mountain Division (10th Light Division (Alpine), 10th Infantry Division). Additionally, several divisions with the same numerical designations were completely separate and unrelated divisions (there have been two 5th Divisions, for instance).

History

Divisions in the United States Army have existed since the American Revolution when, on July 22, 1775-present, George Washington organized three divisions in Boston, Massachusetts. Early American divisions, up until the American Civil War, were primarily temporary organizations, with the basis of the United States Army being brigades and regiments.

During the Civil War, the war in formed the first large true armies in United States history, divisions were formed primarily to support Army Corps, and were usually numbered as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Division of the pertaining corps.

The concept of the permanent United States Army division was formulated and put to the test following the turn of the 20th Century. In 1916, the permanent division would finally be authorized by Congress, resulting in a dramatic change in the Army's force structure. For the first time, the division was the base element of the United States Army and remained as such until the Global War on Terrorism, when the Army switched its emphasis to Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams.

Since the authorizations of permanent divisions, the United States Army has raised 128 separate divisions with unique lineages.

Designations

Prior to 1941, only cavalry divisions were specifically designated; infantry divisions were simply designated by "Division." Following the advent of the armored division, infantry divisions became officially designated by "Infantry Division" (with the 25th Infantry Division being the first constituted by the adjutant general as such). All of the 1917-1941 (non-cavalry) divisions, with the exceptions of the 10th through 20th and 101st Divisions, would be redesignated as Infantry Divisions at some point in the 1941-present era.

Other than the aforementioned Armored, Cavalry, and Infantry, the only official Army division designations are Air Assault (one test division), Airborne, Light (three test divisions in World War II), Motorized (briefly authorized from 1942 to 1943), and Mountain.

Divisions listed with an additional identifier in parentheses ("alpine" or "test," for example) existed only with that identifier. Divisions that have held multiple additional identifiers, such as the 1st Cavalry ("airmobile," "heavy") and the 9th Infantry ("light," "motorized"), are left unidentified, regardless of their current additional identifier.

An unspecified division today refers to a United States Army Reserve Training Division.

- (*) denotes divisions that reorganized under a different division designation while still active
- Bold denotes current United States Army divisions

DIVISIONS - 1911 to 1917

· Maneuver Division (1911)
· 1st Division (1913-1916)
· 2nd Division (1913-1915)
· 3rd Division (1913-1916)
· Cavalry Division - authorized as the 4th Regular Army division in 1913; never officially numerically designated.
· 5th Division (1914-1917)*
· 6th Division (1914-1917)*
· 7th Division (1914-1917)*
· 8th Division (1914-1917)*
· 9th Division (1914-1917)*
· 10th Division (1914-1917)*
· 11th Division (1914-1917)*
· 12th Division (1914-1917)*
· 13th Division (1914-1917)*
· 14th Division (1914-1917)*
· 15th Division (1914-1917)*
· 16th Division (1914-1917)*
· 17th Division (1917)*
· 18th Division (1917)*
· 19th Division (1917)*
· 20th Division (1917)*
· Punitive Expedition - provisional division (1916-1917)

DIVISIONS - 1917 to 1941

Cavalry Divisions
· 1st Cavalry Division (1921-present)
· 2nd Cavalry Division - unorganized [1]
· 3rd Cavalry Division - unorganized [2]
· 15th Cavalry Division (1917-1918)
· 21st Cavalry Division (1921-1940)
· 22nd Cavalry Division (1921-1940)
· 23rd Cavalry Division (1921-1940)
· 24th Cavalry Division (1921-1940)
· 61st Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
· 62rd Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
· 63rd Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
· 64th Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
· 65th Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
· 66th Cavalry Division (1921-1942)
[3] [4]

Infantry Divisions
· 1st Division (1917-present) - later 1st Infantry Division
· 2nd Division (1917-present) - later 2nd Infantry Division
· 3rd Division (1917-present) - later 3rd Infantry Division
· 4th Division (1917-1921)
· 5th Division (1917-1921)
· 6th Division (1917-1921)
· 7th Division (1917-1921)
· 8th Division (1918-1919)
· 9th Division (1918-1919)
· 10th Division (1918-1919)
· 11th Division (1918-1919)
· 12th Division (1918-1919)
· 13th Division (1918-1919)
· 14th Division (1918-1919)
· 15th Division (1918-1919)
· 16th Division (1918-1919)
· 17th Division (1918-1919)
· 18th Division (1918-1919)
· 19th Division (1918-1919)
· 20th Division (1918-1919)
· 26th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 5th Division
· 27th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 6th Division
· 28th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 7th Division
· 29th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 8th Division
· 30th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 9th Division
· 31st Division (1917-1919) (1923-1940)* - formerly 10th Division
· 32nd Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 11th Division
· 33rd Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 12th Division
· 34th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 13th Division
· 35th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 14th Division
· 36th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 15th Division
· 37th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 16th Division
· 38th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 17th Division
· 39th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1923) - formerly 18th Division
· 40th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1941)* - formerly 19th Division
· 41st Division (1917-1919) (1921-1940)* - formerly 20th Division
· 42nd Division (1917-1919)
· 43rd Division (1921-1941)*
· 44th Division (1921-1940)*
· 45th Division (1921-1940)*
· 76th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 77th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 78th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 79th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 80th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 81st Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 82nd Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 83rd Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 84th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 85th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 86th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 87th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 88th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 89th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 90th Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 91st Division (1917-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 92nd Division (1917-1919)
· 93rd Division (1917-1918) - provisional division
· 94th Division (1921-1942)*
· 95th Division (1918-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 96th Division (1918-1919) (1921-1942)*
· 97th Division (1918) (1921-1943)*
· 98th Division (1918) (1921-1942)*
· 99th Division (1918) (1921-1942)*
· 100th Division (1918) (1921-1942)*
· 101st Division (1918) (1921-1942)*
· 102nd Division (1918) (1921-1942)*
· 103rd Division (1921-1942)*
· 104th Division (1921-1942)*
· Hawaiian Division (1921-1941)* (see 24th Infantry Division; also 25th Infantry Division)
· Panama Canal Division (1921-1932)
· Philippine Division (1921-1942) (see 12th Infantry Division)
[5] [6] [7] [8]

DIVISIONS - 1941 to present

Air Assault Divisions
· 11th Air Assault Division (Test) (1963-1965) - formerly 11th Airborne Division

Airborne Divisions
· 6th Airborne Division - phantom World War II division
· 9th Airborne Division - phantom World War II division
· 11th Airborne Division (1943-1957)
· 13th Airborne Division (1943-1946)
· 15th Airborne Division - unorganized World War II division
· 17th Airborne Division (1943-1945) (1948-1949)
· 18th Airborne Division - phantom World War II division
· 21st Airborne Division - phantom World War II division
· 80th Airborne Division (1946-1952)*
· 82nd Airborne Division (1942-present)
· 84th Airborne Division (1946-1952)*
· 100th Airborne Division (1946-1952)*
· 101st Airborne Division (1942-1945) (1948-1949) (1950-1953) (1954-present)
· 108th Airborne Division (1946-1952)*
· 135th Airborne Division - phantom World War II division

Armored Divisions
· 1st Armored Division (1940-1946) (1951-1957) (1962-present) [9]
· 2nd Armored Division (1940-1995)
· 3rd Armored Division (1941-1945) (1947-1992)
· 4th Armored Division (1941-1946) (1954-1971) [10]
· 5th Armored Division (1941-1945) (1950-1956)
· 6th Armored Division (1942-1945) (1950-1956)
· 7th Armored Division (1942-1945) (1950-1953)
· 8th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 9th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 10th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 11th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 12th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 13th Armored Division (1942-1945) (1947-1952)
· 14th Armored Division (1942-1945)
· 15th Armored Division - phantom World War II division
· 16th Armored Division (1943-1945)
· 18th Armored Division - unorganized World War II division
· 19th Armored Division (1946-1947)
· 20th Armored Division (1943-1946)
· 21st Armored Division (1946-1952)
· 22nd Armored Division (1946-1952)
· 25th Armored Division - phantom World War II division
· 27th Armored Division (1954-1967) - formerly 27th Infantry Division
· 30th Armored Division (1954-1973) [11]
· 39th Armored Division - phantom World War II division
· 40th Armored Division (1954-1967) - formerly 40th Infantry Division
· 48th Armored Division (1954-1968) - formerly 48th Infantry Division
· 49th Armored Division (1946-1967) (1973-2004)
· 50th Armored Division (1946-1993)

Cavalry Divisions
· 1st Cavalry Division (1921-present)
· 2nd Cavalry Division (1941-1942) (1943-1944)

Infantry Divisions
· 1st Infantry Division (1917-present)
· 2nd Infantry Division (1917-present)
· 3rd Infantry Division (1917-present)
· 4th Infantry Division (1940-1942)* (1943-1946) (1947-present)
· 5th Infantry Division (1939-1950) (1951-1953) (1954-1957) (1962-1992)
· 6th Infantry Division (1939-1942)* (1943-1949) (1950-1956) (1967-1968) (1984-1998) [12]
· 7th Infantry Division (1940-1942)* (1943-1971) (1974-1994) (1999-2006)
· 8th Infantry Division (1940-1942)* (1943-1945) (1950-1992)
· 9th Infantry Division (1940-1962) (1966-1969) (1972-1991) [13]
· 10th Infantry Division (1947-1957)
· 12th Infantry Division (1946-1947) - formerly Philippine Division
· 14th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 15th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 16th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 17th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 19th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 21st Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 22nd Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 23rd Infantry Division (1954-1956) (1967-1971) - formerly Americal Division
· 24th Infantry Division (1941-1996) (1999-2006) - formerly Hawaiian Division
· 25th Infantry Division (1941-present)
· 26th Infantry Division (1941-1945) (1946-1993)
· 27th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1954)*
· 28th Infantry Division (1941-1945) (1946-present)
· 29th Infantry Division (1941-1946) (1946-1967) (1985-present)
· 30th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1973)
· 31st Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1967)
· 32nd Infantry Division (1940-1946) (1946-1967)
· 33rd Infantry Division (1940-1946) (1946-1967)
· 34th Infantry Division (1941-1945) (1946-1963) (1991-present)
· 35th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1963) (1984-present)
· 36th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1967) (2004-present)
· 37th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1967)
· 38th Infantry Division (1941-1945) (1946-present)
· 39th Infantry Division (1946-1967)
· 40th Infantry Division (1941-1946) (1946-1954)* (1973-present)
· 41st Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1967)
· 42nd Infantry Division (1943-present)
· 43rd Infantry Division (1941-1945) (1946-1963)
· 44th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1954)
· 45th Infantry Division (1940-1945) (1946-1967)
· 46th Infantry Division (1946-1967)
· 47th Infantry Division (1946-1991)
· 48th Infantry Division (1946-1954)*
· 49th Infantry Division (1947-1967)
· 50th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 51st Infantry Division (1946-1963)
· 52nd Infantry Division (1946-1947)
· 55th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 59th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 61st Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 62rd Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 63rd Infantry Division (1943-1945) (1952-1965)
· 65th Infantry Division (1943-1945)
· 66th Infantry Division (1943-1945)
· 67th Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 68th Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 69th Infantry Division (1943-1945) (1954-1956)
· 70th Infantry Division (1943-1945) (1952-1955)*
· 71st Infantry Division (1944-1946) (1954-1956)
· 72nd Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 73rd Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 74th Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 75th Infantry Division (1943-1945) (1952-1957)
· 76th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1955)*
· 77th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1965)
· 78th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1955)*
· 79th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1963)
· 80th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1952-1955)
· 81st Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1965)
· 82nd Infantry Division (1942)*
· 83rd Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1965)
· 84th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1952-1955)*
· 85th Infantry Division (1942-1955)*
· 86th Infantry Division (1942-1946)
· 87th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1957)
· 88th Infantry Division (1942-1947)
· 89th Infantry Division (1942-1943)* (1944-1945) (1946-1955)*
· 90th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1965)
· 91st Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1955)*
· 92nd Infantry Division (1942-1945)
· 93rd Infantry Division (1942-1946) [14]
· 94th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1963)
· 95th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1955)*
· 96th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1963)
· 97th Infantry Division (1943-1946)
· 98th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1955)*
· 99th Infantry Division (1942-1945)
· 100th Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1952-1955)*
· 102nd Infantry Division (1942-1946) (1946-1965)
· 103rd Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1963)
· 104th Infantry Division (1942-1945) (1946-1959)*
· 105th Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 106th Infantry Division (1943-1945) (1946-1950) [15]
· 107th Infantry Division - unorganized World War II division
· 108th Infantry Division (1952-1955)*
· 109th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 112th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 119th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 125th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 130th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 141st Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· 157th Infantry Division - phantom World War II division
· Americal Division (1942-1945) (see 23rd Infantry Division)
[16]

Light Divisions
· 10th Light Division (Alpine) (1943-1944)*
· 71st Light Division (Truck) (1943-1944)*
· 89th Light Division (Pack) (1943-1944)*

Motorized Divisions
· 4th Motorized Division (1942-1943)*
· 5th Motorized Division - phantom World War II division
· 6th Motorized Division (1942-1943)*
· 7th Motorized Division (1942-1943)*
· 8th Motorized Division (1942-1943)*
· 90th Motorized Division (1942-1943)*

Mountain Divisions
· 10th Mountain Division (1944-1945) (1984-present)

Reserve Training Divisions

In an attempt to maintain its divisions, the Army Reserve transformed several of its combat divisions into training divisions; these divisions were still designated as infantry divisions until authorized as "divisions (training)" by the adjutant general in 1959.

· 70th Division (1955-1996)
· 75th Division (1993-2008)
· 76th Division (1955-1996)
· 78th Division (1955-2008)
· 80th Division (1955-2008)
· 84th Division (1955-2004)
· 85th Division (1955-2008)
· 87th Division (1993-2008)
· 89th Division (1955-1975)
· 91st Division (1955-2008)
· 95th Division (1955-present)
· 98th Division (1955-2008)
· 100th Division (1955-present)
· 104th Division (1959-present)
· 108th Division (1955-2008)
· First Army Division East (2006-present)
· First Army Division West (2006-present)

Notes

[1] a 2nd Cavalry Division was constituted in 1921, but would remain unorganized until World War II
[2] the 3rd Cavalry Division was placed on rolls in 1927 to complete an intended Cavalry Corps, but was never organized
[3] in 1940 the National Guard voluntarily withdrew their allotment of the 21st through 24th Cavalry Divisions, partially in response to the Army's decision that the National Guard did not need four Cavalry Divisions and the Army's unwillingness to allot the National Guard armored divisions
[4] the 61st through 66th Cavalry Divisions existed primarily as officer billets with enlisted cadre; they were dropped from the activation rolls and disbanded in 1942
[5] various elements of the 4th through 9th Divisions remained on active duty until those divisions' full activation prior to World War II.
[6] the 76th through 91st and 94th through 104th Divisions existed primarily as officer billets with enlisted cadre; they were not completely reactivated until America's entry into World War II
[7] a 94th Division was intended as a Spanish-speaking division for World War I, but the assignment was withheld due to political wrangling
[8] the infantry brigades, field artillery brigades, and several other of the subordinate units of the Panama Canal, Hawaiian, and Philippine Divisions were numbered accordingly with what should have been the 10th, 11th, and 12th Divisions
[9] the 1st Armored Division's Combat Command A remained on active duty between 1957 and 1962
[10] the 4th Armored Division was effectively organized as the Constabulary from 1946 to 1954
[11] the 30th Armored Division was organized as the result of an agreement between Tennessee and North Carolina to split the 30th Infantry Division
[12] the 6th Infantry Division itself was deactivated in 1994, but the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division remained in the active force under that designation until being reflagged as the 172nd Infantry Brigade in 1998
[13] the 9th Infantry Division experienced a brief period of inactivation in 1947
[14] although the 93rd Infantry Division shares the same number designation and patch as the previous 93rd Division, the two divisions are otherwise unrelated and do not share lineal ties
[15] the 106th Infantry Division was never officially added to the troop list following World War II, despite having been almost completely organized in Puerto Rico by 1948; subsequently, the War Department determined the division was not needed and deactivated the division headquarters in 1950
[16] the 105th and 107th Infantry Divisions were intended to be negro divisions of the Army of the United States; however, due to a shortage of available manpower, their activations were canceled in 1942

References

· Bellanger, Yves J. (2002). US Army Infantry Divisions, 1943-1945, Volume 1: Organisation, Doctrine and Equipment. Solihull: Helion.
· Holt, Thaddeus (2004). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. New York: Simon & Schuster.
· Muschett, James O. (ed.) (2001). The Army. Westport: Hugh Lauter Levin.
· Stanton, Shelby L. (2006). World War II Order of Battle: An Encyclopedic Reference to U.S. Army Ground Forces from Battalion through Division, 1939-1946 (Revised Edition). Mechanicsburg: Stackpole.
· Stewart, Richard W. (ed.) (2005). American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
· Tolson, John J. (1989). Airmobility 1961-1971. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
· Wilson, John B. (1987). Armies, Corps, Divisions, and Separate Brigades. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
· Wilson, John B. (1997). Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

For Tradition; For Progress: An Army Force Structure Proposal

The United States military is currently in the midst of its transformation from its old identity as a force designed to face 20th Century Cold War threats to its new identity as a force designed to face so-called "long war" threats. While I may disagree with some of the proposed changes (we should never have a military unready to face conventional enemies), the US Army, by and large, has been the most successful service of our armed forces in balancing tradition with progress.

Most successful, yes, but that ain't stating much.

For the most part, I am going to ignore the technical and logistical aspects of the transition, and will focus on the symbolic aspects. A symbolism, mind you, rife with unnecessary bureaucracy and a seemingly desperate manic bipolar clinging to both history and political correctness.

I'm confusing you, I know. So, to make a long intro short: the Army should change the public appearance of its force structure in order to more effectively promote the change in operational efficiency of its force structure.

Still confused? Fine. The Army should reflag its current divisions to better reflect its own history as well as its need to adapt to the 21st Century.

I'll get to why this will help later, but first, some background.

The Current Force Structure

As of today, there are 10 active-duty divisions in the United States Army. They are as follows: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; the 10th Mountain Division; the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions; the 1st Cavalry Division; the 1st Armored Division.

Cut and dried, no?

Well, not exactly.

Of those, the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions are actually armored divisions, as is the 1st Cavalry Division. The 10th Mountain Division is simply a light infantry division, and the 101st Airborne is what's known as an air assault division.

In an Army supposedly concerned with cutting through its own bureaucratic bullshit, this is, quite simply, ridiculous.

Divisional Order of Precedence

In order for the Army to "properly" respect its history and traditions, the Center for Military History (the official Army authority concerning Army history) was tasked to prioritize its divisions based upon time in service, number of campaigns, and number of unit citations a division has received.

By that logic, one would surmise that the ten divisions currently active in the Army are the top ten divisions on that priority list. This is not the case.

The 1st Armored Division ranks 16th on that list, and the 10th Mountain Division ranks 20th. Which means that two divisions actually in the top 10, the 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions, are inexplicably inactive.

Official Army rhetoric concerning the discrepancy is that 1) there should be at least one armored division on the rolls, and 2) there should be at least one specialty light division.

The problem with this is that, as mentioned earlier, there are four armored divisions on the rolls, and two "specialty" light divisions (the 25th Infantry and the 101st Airborne).

So, logic = out the window.

Regular Army Nomenclature

Around World War I, when the Army finally authorized permanent divisions, it was agreed that army divisions would be numbered 1 through 25 for the United States Army, 26 through 75 for the National Guard, and 76 up for the National Army, now known as the Army Reserve. As armored divisions did not exist at the time, this system was not applied to armored divisions when they were formed later on in World War II. It was, however, applied to cavalry divisions and would eventually be applied to armored divisions following the war.

But along came the airborne division. And, as with many new concepts of that era, a lack of acceptance by existing military commanders. Which was why the task for testing and forming airborne divisions fell to the National Army. Hence, the 82nd and 101st. Later on, when the concept was accepted and applied, the regular army formed the 11th, 13th, and 17th airborne divisions (and was slated to form the 15th), keeping with its established nomenclature system.

Following WWII, the National Army/Army Reserve maintained five airborne divisions of its own. But, for posterity's sake, the 82nd and 101st weren't two of them. No, those two divisions would defy existing protocols and be absorbed into the regular Army. Ironically, the 15th Airborne Division was slated for activation into the Army Reserve, but was denied because "15" did not fit into the Army Reserve designations.

Proposed Force Structure

So what am I getting at here? Well, the Army should restructure its system, both to adhere to its own traditions and protocols, and to acknowledge its role as a highly adaptable and willing-to-change fighting force. And it can begin to perceptibly accomplish this by simply reflagging two divisions and redesignating two others.

As I've already explained how the Army no longer maintains a strict differential between infantry and armored divisions, the Army should reflag the 1st Armored Division as the 9th Infantry Division, which shares the seventh position on the Army's own divisional order of precendence. The fact that the Army is largely moving to combined arms brigades only supports this proposal further.

Similarly, the Army should reflag the 10th Mountain Division as the 7th Infantry Division. The 7th, throughout its history, has often been accepted as a "specialized" division anyway, and is famously known as being one of the best light infantry divisions in US history.

Controversially, I'll admit, the Army should redesignate the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions as the 22nd and 21st Airborne Divisions, respectively. This will bring their numeric designations in line with those designations reserved for the regular Army, and free up 82 and 101 for future use by the Army Reserves, which is where those divisions originated anyway. Of course, the 21st and 22nd Airborne Divisions will retain the heraldry of the "old" 101st and 82nd.

And, last, but not least, as cavalry divisions have no doubt gone the way of the dodo, simply remove the numeric designation of the 1st Cavalry Division and just call it the Cavalry Division (which is a historic designation, by the way) or even the 15th Cavalry Division (another historic designation).

Of course, we could just do away with the special designators ("Infantry," "Cavalry," etc.) altogether and just go back to plain old numbered divisions, but that might be asking too much.

Why Do It?

The answer is simple: to set an example. Almost everyone is in agreement that the Army's bureaucracy is screwed up, and by returning in-line with its own protocols, it can send the signal that it is, in fact, respectful of its own traditions. Additionally, by redesignating the airborne divisions, it can also send the signal that the US Army is an Army willing to change itself in the face of a public who increasingly views the military with distrusting, inflexible eyes.

Because giving everyone a beret and allowing everyone to wear jump boots is not the answer.

Author's Note: even I'm not sold on the redesignation of the airborne divisions, but the point made is valid, and is probably something that should've been done years ago.

Every Man a Rifleman

There's the Army. There's the Marine Corps. On paper, almost 100% identical in tactics, strategy, logistics, and mission. Sure, the Marine Corps is dictated by one more sentence regarding its ability to be "directly controlled by the President" (which is, so sad to say, mere lip service) and the word "amphibious" is replaced by "airborne" when pertaining to the Army, but you get the point.

Ideally, these services are identical, save for method of deployment and primary objectives. Practically, however, these services are as different as two land-based military branches run by the same government can be.

For those who aren't familiar with my (highly-researched) opinions, let me back up a tad... I believe the United States Marine Corps should not fall under the umbrella of the Department of the Navy, but should in fact belong to the Department of the Army. Basic and intermediate trainings of both the Army and Marine Corps should be identical and, in fact, shared. Their recruiting and logistics systems should be combined. Long story short: the Army and the Marine Corps should be a single branch of service.

Regarding this, however, the theoretical philosophical basis of the Marine Corps is far, far better than the theoretical philosophical basis of the Army (which, as far as I can tell, doesn't have one). In the Marine Corps: "every man a rifleman." This translates to every Marine (male or female) being fundamentally and undeniably a member of Marine infantry, regardless of a Marine's listed job title. While this may make little difference on the actual modern battlefield, given the current dynamic of military strategy and logistics, it does make quite a bit of difference in the day-to-day workplace of a military branch. Yes, most Marines will admit that the "every man a rifleman" is more slogan than reality, but the very fact that the slogan exists is probably effective enough.

In the Army there is a definitive differential between a combat soldier and a support soldier. Not only in training, but in professional attitude. The support soldier exists for one reason and one reason only: to support the combat soldier. There is no need for an admin or finance clerk, or a legal assistant, or a mechanic, or a cook, save for supporting the infantryman (or woman) and his kin. That's all, nothing else.

And therein lies the problem. Support soldiers tend to feel that they run the Army (which, in point of fact, they basically do) and there is a bit of a prejudice against the actual reason for an army's existence, which is the aforementioned combat soldier. These support soldiers live in air conditioning, are usually less physically-fit than combat soldiers, do not train as hard for field operations, and basically treat their role in the Armed Forces as a typical 9 to 5 job (yes, there are exceptions, but everybody knows what I'm talking about). I will go so far as to claim that these "support specialists" are not even true soldiers.

And this needs to be fixed. And quickly.

The Marines do it. All Marines undergo basic combat courses on a semi-regular basis. And I'm not talking about little field exercises or what the Army refers to as "Sergeant's Time." I'm talking full-on schools designed to keep all Marines combat-ready. The clerk, the cook, the air conditioner mechanic. All of them. Why? Well, because in the Marine Corps, "every man a rifleman."

Philosophically, it's perfect for an armed service. EVERYONE should expect to fight, kill, and die, regardless of what their "day job" is. The Marines beat it into their recruits from day one. The Army? Not so much. In fact... not at all.

Almost immediately, the Army separates its combat soldiers from its support soldiers by way of a training system referred to as OSUT or "One-Station Unit Training." Basically, specific combat arms MOS' go to combined boot camp and specialty schools that only that particular MOS goes to. Logistically and financially, OSUT is almost undoubtedly the preferred method of training. However, practically, OSUT is likely the very reason for the attitude split so painfully evident in the ranks of the Army.

The solution is simple. Get rid of OSUT and go back to "everbody" boot camps and combat arm AITs. Require non-combat specialities to attend a combat training course similar to the USMC's MCT (Marine Combat Training) course. Optionally, bring back the specialist ranks for those support soldiers who are not "combat qualified." However it gets done, put the Army back into the hands of the people who should run it: the combatants.

Every Soldier Infantry. How's that sound?

The Contractor Problem

Blackwater. Halliburton. Blah dee blah. We all know who (or at least what) they are; most of us know what they do. But what we don't know is why they are even here.

The short answer is the one answer most of us turn to, since we lack the knowledge and interest to be able to answer the question in detail: corrupt government.

Unfortunately, this is not the accurate answer, nor is it even a relevant one (despite some truth behind it). Contractors exist because of the American way of life. And that is, for lack of better term, one of capitalism. For those of you who didn't know, our country runs on a business model in which any industry or service can be turned into a lucrative venture with which a clever entrepreneur can exploit.

In this case, it is known as the military-industrial complex. A complex, somewhat ironically, that we were warned against embracing by a former 5-star general and President, good ol' Ike. Unfortunately for Ike's successors, there were no laws governing the limitations of such a complex and now our military is paying the price.

Let me back up for a moment and posit a thesis: any military that is not entirely self-sufficient is doomed to fail.

And therein lies the problem.

We all know (or at least should) that our military is currently far too small. The Navy is comparitively small for our needs and continues to shed its logistical duties to (gasp) civilian contractors. The Army is undeniably tiny and is at its breaking point, and also continues to shed logistical duties in favor of civilian support. Additionally, however, the Army is even losing some of its tactical duties to civilian contractors. I know this is a few years late, but... what?

Obvious problems aside, private armies such as Blackwater look great on paper (at least in the pamphlets), but in practice are a horrific waste of money and a terrifying transfer of what used to be typical military duties. This entry is not the place to get into the minutae, but, in essence, taxpayers are getting screwed. For a job that a standard, disciplined soldier would have done 30 years ago, we are paying exhorbitant salaries for civilian contractors who, by the way, don't have the same accountability as a servicemember. $60,000 a year for an unaccountable "bodyguard" versus maybe $30,000 a year for someone who answers to the Uniformed Code of Military Justice? That's like firing your child who lives with you for mere room and board and hiring a replacement for room, board, and a $30,000 per year allowance. Oh, yeah, and a replacement who doesn't necessarily have to do what you tell him or her to do.

I don't know in what world the theater oversights are doing business, but that arrangement can't possibly sound good under any amount of propaganda.

Not only that, these very same private armies are recruiting our best and brightest soldiers and sailors out of our armed forces. In other words, the government is paying these companies to compete with itself. Which, as everyone should be able to figure out, drives up costs continuously and astronomically.

I could keep going, but the bottom line is: we're fucking ourselves.

I'll return to this subject again in the future, but on a closing note, I do need to point out that this phenomenon is not only the fault of the government and these greedy corporations, it's also the fault of the American people. It's no secret that finding people who actually want to serve is becoming harder and harder every day. Kids these days feel like they're owed something, and that's bullshit. Disagree? Then why are all these self-serving punks whining about not having free college?

JFK said it best: "Ask not what your country can do for you..." Well, you know the rest. And if you don't, you obviously don't give a shit anyway.

Home

Strange thing happened to me this week. Well, I guess it would be more accurate to state that a strange thing happened to me again this week. The world reiterated to me that I have no home.

Most people consider a single place their home. Indeed, there's an interesting statistic that reveals that most Americans (and I'm sure this applies to most human beings) die within 50 miles of where they were born. I don't remember exactly where I read that, but I do remember thinking how odd that was.

As humans, we are the only species on this planet capable of going anywhere we choose, any time we choose. The world is ours to travel, to work in, to play in. Why should we die so closely to where we were born? Now, I do realize that many people simply return to where they were originally from after a lifetime of adventure, but I do also know that many people never even bother to leave the roost, so to speak. Again, why?

Anyway, this past week I worked in Atlanta, away from where I currently reside (a residence, I might add, that I do not consider "home"). And you know what? I didn't feel out of place, out of time, or any other comparative fish-out-of-water expression. I guess one could say that I felt at home. As much at home as anywhere else.

When I was in the Army I always found it amazing that people intended on returning to the very place they had left after their stint in the military was over. These people had just seen much of the world, done things they never would have done otherwise, and they wanted to return... "home."

I have my parents to thank for my attitude, I suppose. A father who never liked to stay in one place too long and a mother who has only seen her homeland a handful of times in the last 40 years.

Next year I will move again. To a place I have been before, but not one I ever properly called home, nor ever will.

I have no home. The world is my home. And I won't have it any other way.

Questions I've Been Asked

I'm bored and can't sleep, so I've decided to write about several questions that have been asked of me lately. Why? Well, I figure if I write the answers down, nobody will ask me those questions again. Hey, I hate repeating myself. I mean, I really hate repeating myself. I just really, really don't like repeating myself.

Q1. Why aren't you writing about the Presidential candidates?
A1. Because I don't really care at this point in time. Ron Paul and Mike Gravel are ultra-wingers who, while they belong in national politics and are needed, don't need to be in the White House. Romney appears to be a fraud, and is hiding something, as is Obama. Speaking of, Obama and Clinton are merely riding their "making history" trains, to the point of being irritating. Huckabee is, well, Huckabee. McCain is playing both sides of the train tracks. And Edwards and Giulani are now officially out (thank the maker). And that's how I feel about that.

Q2. Why aren't you in Los Angeles?
A2. Several reasons: 1) financial trouble stemming from a few years back finally caught up to me, 2) legal trouble stemming from a couple of years back made staying on the West Coast a precipitous proposition, 3) military trouble from a few years back is haunting me. That's it in a nutshell.

Q3. Why aren't you actively pursuing your writing career?
A3. My computer sucks... seriously... to the point of really pissing me off, causing me to purposefully limit my computer time (and, hence, my writing time). And outside stressors, while nowhere near debilitating, keep my mind on those stressors.

Q4. Why don't you like Philip Rivers?
A4. I don't dislike him, I'm just not entirely convinced yet. He's no Drew Brees, and he let Eli Manning beat him to a Super Bowl.

Q5. Why don't you take one of those government jobs you qualify for?
A5. HAHAHAHAHAHA. Been there, done that, won't do it again until I have more influence.

Q6. Why aren't you finishing up grad school?
A6. Because I'm picky (sorry, ECU), my computer sucks, and I have other things on my mind.

Q7. What do you think of the title of the new James Bond movie?
A7. I like it, if only because it's an Ian Fleming title. Although I can see how aesthetically "non-movie-Bond" it is. At least it's not something really stupid like Attack of the Clones.

Q8. Why don't you like the newer Star Wars movies?
A8. Bad acting, bad directing, bad story, over-the-top effects, and a general disregard for established story continuity a bad movie does make.

Q9. Why are you so hard on Battlestar Galactica?
A9. Because it started out so great, then turned to shit. I usually don't make across-the-board statements, but anyone who actually liked Season 3 is an idiot.

Q10. Why do you think we should restructure the military?
A10. Because we're wasting money. Money that could be used in making our military bigger.

Q11. Since you want to join the WGA, why aren't you supporting them in the current strike?
A11. I am now, at least more than I was. But prior to their dropping of some of their demands, they were being a bunch of whiny morons.

Q12. Why aren't you more specific in some of your writings?
A12. Because I'm lazy, and specificity by nature requires a lot of repetition... and I hate repeating myself. Repeating myself pisses me off, and only makes me hate repeating myself even more.

In Defense of Military Perspectives

Those of you who read me regularly (a shocking thought, I know) know full and well my view concerning the administrative wastefulness in maintaining a Navy-based Marine Corps and a separate Air Force. These views are well-researched, are based upon a study actually conducted by an Air Force Major, and are, undebatably, fact.

Sure, that the concept would ultimately benefit our military's effectiveness is highly opinionated, but that the concept would cheapen the cost of our military and lessen the burden on taxpayers (and allow for a larger military) is, once again, undebatably fact.

I receive a lot of feedback from a lot of people, many of them current and former servicemembers, concerning my highly controversial views. I can honestly say that none of their counterarguments hold any physical, fiscal, or operational weight. While that may sound a bit arrogant on my part, and probably a bit ignorant, it is true. Every counterargument I hear or read boils down to one thing: tradition.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, tradition is a wonderful thing to have (especially in the military) and we should do everything in our power to preserve it, but it should never, ever, get in the way of our adaptability. Ironically, the military seems to agree with most of my points and principles, except they hide my proposals by creating even more-bureaucratic "joint commands" instead of eliminated the fluff that requires the creation of such commands.

Going back to feedback, as I was in the Army for a total of nine years, I am often (if not always) accused of approaching my proposed military restructuring from an Army-centric perspective. I am writing this to show that this is not the case.

When I began my research, it was to support a spinning-off of the Airborne into its own branch of the military. An "Airborne Corps" of the Army, much in the same way the Marine Corps is of the Navy. A self-sufficient fighting force that is only related to its parent unit by way of funding and a shared medium.

My original proposal called for an Airborne Corps with its own close air support assets (like the Marine Corps has) and its own airlift (Army paratroopers currently rely on the Air Force for well over 90% of their jumps). In addition, it would have its own armor assets and logistics structure.

Now, this looked all fine and dandy on paper, and in a fictional short-story or two, but once I got into the budgetary portion of my research, it became clear that such a concept would be entirely cost-prohibitive. It became clear so quickly, that I didn't even bother to continue my research.

So, being a paratrooper and all, I decided to look into the feasibility of an Air Force-run Airborne Corps. After all, why not? Two options quickly set themselves apart from all of the other Air Force-Airborne options: 1) The Air Force would have to build its own infantry administration and operation systems, or 2) the Air Force would simply rely on the Army to train its paratroopers, and then feed them into the Air Force chain-of-command.

The first point would have been, quite obviously, too expensive (seems to be a pattern, doesn't it?) The second would have been, just as obviously, quite redundant.

And then it all came together. A Navy-Marine Corps is redundant, and a separate Air Force hobbles the Army's need for its own air superiority, airlift, and close air support. And, sorry, there's no way you can argue that, save for "tradition" (a point, by the way, which only weakly applies to the Air Force).

Which led to my current line of research, which only convinces me more and more every day that the Marine Corps should realign under the Department of the Army, and Air Force assets should be absorbed by the Army and the Navy.

My point? I started on this route in the exact opposite direction that I am almost always accused of taking. Army-centric? No, not by a long shot.

Airborne-centric? Oh, Hell yeah.

Want to read more? Check here:

An Army of More Than One

Everyone who has been in the military knows of the utter chaos involved in running a unit, much less a full-scale operation. Hell, most people who haven't been in the military have heard the stories, as well. There's even a popular saying attributed to several foreign generals (none of whom probably actually said it): "War is chaos. The reason the Americans are so good at it is because they practice chaos every day."

Okay, so maybe that's a good thing... in war games and training, anyway, but not at the administrative level. Regardless of the ground-floor operational intent and execution, any institution's administration should be clean and efficient. And the Army (and military in general) is not.

While there are several balls of wax and cans of worms I can get into, today I'm going to concentrate on one: the Army's various missions separated among its capabilities. What are its capabilities, you might ask? Well, I'll tell you: armored warfare, light infantry warfare, and airborne warfare (and, if I get my way, amphibious warfare). It's more than just an "Army of One," it's a multifaceted organization that should emphasize its multiple faces.

In the current system, soldiers, regardless of their qualifications, are often levied and transferred (usually involuntarily) to other duty stations. This results in soldiers, who for the last few years have been airborne or light, being sent to armored and mechanized units. What's the big deal? Well, it forces that soldier, who has been trained and indoctrinated in a particular style of warfare, to be re-trained and re-indoctrinated into a new one. While I agree that one should always know as much about related and opposing operations as possible, I disagree in that one should be arbitrarily pulled from their "areas of expertise."

The solution is simple: keep those aligned soldiers in their alignments. In other words, if a soldier is airborne, leave him in the airborne. If he must transfer, transfer him to another airborne unit. The same goes for armored and mechanized soldiers: leave them mechanized. Should the Marine Corps be absorbed into the Army, leave the Marines as Marines. Light infantry is a bit more of a mess, but leave light, well, light. Perhaps even separate the light category into air assault and non-air assault (or even mountain).

This will ultimately create better trained and prepared units, will leave soldiers familiar with the quirks and nuances of their peers with their peers, and will decrease the pressure on the Army's administration system by getting rid of a hack levy and PCS (Permanent Change of Station) system.

Of course, should a soldier want to change his or her specialty and/or duty station, then by all means, afford him or her the opportunity. I also understand that several vacated higher positions in particular units will have to be filled by pulling a qualified soldier from another specialty and/or location.

Just knock off the unnecessary mixing and matching, okay?

An Overview of Restructuring the Military

I admit it, this isn't really a true blog, but as I've entered a new phase in my military-based research, I've decided to link all of my military blogs in one blog for easy access (and for those of you who might still be interested).

There is, undoubtedly, more to follow, including the Department of Defense's ridiculous propensity to preserve General and Admiral slots while pretending to streamline the actual force structure.

Anyway, here they are:

The Army Corps of... Marines?

Army Musings

The Military Draft: No So Random Thoughts

United States Marine Corps, Department of the Army

The United States Air Force: a Parasite Organization

Marine Corps versus Army: the Rank Problem

For those of you who might prefer a summary, basically:

1) The US Air Force should be split among the Army and the Navy, with close air support, tactical bombing, airlift, and air superiority assets going to the Army, and strategic air going to the Navy.
2) The US Marine Corps should realign under the Army.
3) The military in general should eliminate at least three enlisted and three officer ranks, and should reevaluate the necessity of the warrant officer system.
4) The military in general should eliminate as many flag positions as possible, thereby truly streamlining the command structure and increasing the efficiency of its administration system.

And there you have it.

Marine Corps versus Army: the Rank Problem

Given the current flow of information from the Department of Defense, one might assume that there aren't enough ranks in the military to properly control and command our armed forces. After all, while already having nine enlisted grades, there are often reports of the services trying to approve a tenth grade, to be reserved for the top enlisted man (or woman) in a particular service. On top of that, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are inundated with an oft-confusing "warrant officer" system that is, to be quite honest, redundant and pragmatically unnecessary.

Both of these quirky little facts, combined with an officer system that contains up to eleven ranks (ten in peacetime), and what we actually have is a system that is too large, overwrought, and bad for business. Particularly when it comes to discipline.

While the majority of what I'm going to rant about concerns the enlisted ranks, let's go ahead and gloss over the officer system.

Eleven ranks. With the exception of the Navy, the rank structure for officers proceeds like this:

1. Second Lieutenant
2. First Lieutenant
3. Captain
4. Major
5. Lieutenant Colonel
6. Colonel
7. Brigadier General
8. Major General
9. Lieutenant General
10. General
11. General of the Army (Air Force - the USMC has no equivalent).

What's the problem, you might ask? Well, for starters, this rank system is designed to deal with an armed force based on a regimental system. A system that we quit using nearly a century ago. But to spell it out, let's take a look at the "natural progression," shall we?

In the Army and Marine Corps, units commanded by officers progress as such:

1. Platoons - commanded by Second Lieutenants
2. Companies (or their "regimental equivalent" - basically, whether it's cavalry, artillery, or infantry) - commanded by Captains
3. Battalions - commanded by Lieutenant Colonels
4. Brigades - commanded by Colonels, or, depending on the make-up, Brigadier Generals (which is where the name "Brigadier" originated)
5. Divisions - commanded by Major Generals
6. Corps - commanded by Lieutenant Generals
7. Armies - commanded by Generals

There are more above armies, but unless another true world war breaks out, they're not likely to be used ever again. Indeed, even the "basis unit" has shifted downward to brigades, rather than divisions.

Anyway, take a look at that unit/officer chart. Where are, for instance, the natural positions for First Lieutenants and Majors? I understand that I'm asking you to infer a lot on your own, and I will probably follow this up with another article explaining the inherent problem with those ommissions, but just bear with me.

From that chart alone, and without any other justification, we have two officer ranks too many. More evidence, including some implied above, would also suggest that colonels should shift down to battalions, leaving brigadier generals in their natural position of commanding brigades, allowing the lieutenant colonel rank to also be ommitted.

Ugh... on to the enlisted ranks.

Here are the Army/Marine Corps ranks for enlisted:

1. Private / Private
2. Private / Private First Class
3. Private First Class / Lance Corporal
4. Corporal (Specialist) / Corporal
5. Sergeant / Sergeant
6. Staff Sergeant / Staff Sergeant
7. Sergeant First Class / Gunnery Sergeant
8. Master Sergeant / Master Sergeant
9. Sergeant Major / Sergeant Major

Those soldiers and Marines reading this will know there are some variations to some of these ranks, but, again, bear with me.

Okay... nine ranks... and for what?

To put this in perspective, let's look at the basic infantry squads in both the Army and Marine Corps.

In the Army, the basic infantry squad is a nine-man unit, with a squad leader and two teams consisting of a team leader, grenadier, automatic rifleman, and rifleman each.

The squad is commanded by a Staff Sergeant (E-6), while the teams are commanded by Sergeants (E-5). The remaining six soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1 or E-2), Privates First Class (E-3), Specialists (E-4), or Corporals (also E-4).

So, basically, the building-block unit of the Army has three Non-Commissioned Officers, and six other enlisted. A 1:2 ratio. Keep in mind, the non-NCOs can consist of all E-1s or all E-4s, or any variation in-between and thereof.

Where's the rank structure? Where's the top-down? How fucking stupid is that? Six separate grades for nine people?

The Marine Corps' setup is, undeniably, far more logical. A basic Marine Corps infantry squad is thirteen men, with a squad leader and three teams consisting of a team leader, an automatic rifleman, an assistant automatic rifleman, and a rifleman each.

The MC squad is commanded by a Sergeant (E-5), while the teams are commanded by Corporals (E-4). The remaining nine soldiers are a mix of Privates (E-1), Privates First Class (E-2), or Lance Corporals (E-3).

Though still a bit of a muddled mess, there is far more of a semblance of a proper rank structure in the Marine Corps squad than is found in the Army squad.

However, in both systems, we have revealed at least two too many enlisted grades at the squad level.

Here is how it should progress:

1. Privates - in charge of nothing
2. Corporals - in charge of fire teams
3. Sergeants - in charge of squads
4. Staff/Gunnery Sergeants - Platoon Sergeants
5. Master Sergeants - Company First Sergeants, etc.
6. Sergeant Majors - Senior Battalion(+) enlisted.

An elimination of three enlisted ranks, a streamlining of the enlisted chain-of-command, an increase in respect for the lower enlisted ranks, and a true merit-based promotion system.

Counter-arguments against doing such a thing (besides the totally irrelevant and inane "tradition" argument) will probably focus on the ability to promote soldiers to increase their wages. While I'm always for making more money, do we really want soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen shooting for promotions ONLY because the next rank pays more? Fuck no, we don't. We want sergeants who WANT to be sergeants, because they WANT the power and responsibility that comes with it... not because they want another $200 or $300 a month. And regardless, that problem is so easily fixed, I'm going to point out how in the next paragraph.

The Army and Marine Corps' pay and promotion system is already heavily computerized, and separating pay grade from rank would be as simple as modifying the computer software. Hell, in that aspect, the military could create as many pay grades as it deems necessary, all while leaving the rank structure streamlined, intact, and with a clear chain-of-command. It's high-time we start streamlining things and bringing back respect for our ranks.

(Yes, I'm just glossing the surface, and, yes, I realize this post is a little chaotic, but hopefully your eyes are opening a little bit. Feel free to hammer me with questions and arguments.)